Picking Sides: A World of Opinions on South China Sea Case

By Matthew Pennington

A case brought by U.S. ally the Philippines against China represents a diplomatic dilemma for far-flung nations as Washington and Beijing rally support for their respective positions on the use of international arbitration in South China Sea disputes.

The United States has been building diplomatic pressure in the West and in Asia on China to abide by the Hague-based tribunal's decision, which is expected soon. China, which maintains it won't be bound by the ruling, has been pushing back by building support from nations mostly in Africa and the Mideast.

The U.S. is not a party to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, under which the tribunal has been constituted, but says it wants China to play by international rules. Since there is no enforcement mechanism for the ruling, any impact will depend on how the international community reacts.

Here's a look at where dozens of countries stand:

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

ASEAN has been trying for years to achieve diplomatic solutions in the South China Sea, making little progress and exposing divisions in the 10-member bloc, which includes the Philippines. Reaching consensus on the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling will be tough.

When President Barack Obama met ASEAN leaders in February they agreed on "full respect for legal and diplomatic processes" in accordance with the U.N. convention, but pro-China members Cambodia and Laos nixed any mention of "arbitration."

Vietnam, which has fought China over competing South China Sea claims, has been most supportive of the Philippines' case and submitted a statement to the tribunal. Hanoi has said it supports "full compliance" to the procedures of the convention.

But other ASEAN nations are generally wary of speaking out for fear of alienating China, the region's economic heavyweight. Malaysia and Brunei have said little about the case, though they too are South China Sea claimants.

Indonesia and Singapore are not claimants but have been a bit more outspoken. Singapore's Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said last week that the ruling could have implications beyond the South China Sea and "we cannot subscribe to the principle that might is right." Indonesia's Foreign Ministry declined to say whether the ruling should be binding on both sides but said international law must be respected.

Even the Philippines' position is unpredictable as a new government takes office there June 30. President-elect Rodrigo Duterte has expressed willingness to restart bilateral negotiations with China.

RUSSIA

Moscow, which shares China's suspicion of Washington, is Beijing's most prominent supporter on the issue. On a visit to China in April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia is against any interference from outside parties in the South China Sea — a reference to the U.S. — "or any attempts to internationalize these disputes." Like China, Russia says disputes should be resolved through talks between the parties directly involved.

CHINA SUPPORTERS IN AFRICA, MIDEAST

China's state news agency Xinhua on May 20 said that more than 40 countries have expressed support for China's stance on the arbitration case. The Foreign Ministry has in recent weeks given prominent mention to support it claims to have from nations principally in Africa, the Mideast and Central Asia.

But few of those foreign governments have issued statements independently. Some, including Cambodia, Laos and Fiji, have disavowed China's description of their position.

Experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington said they could confirm official statements from Afghanistan, Gambia, Niger, Sudan and Vanuatu. A Chinese statement with the 21-member Arab League supported China but it was unclear if it represented all the parties' official positions.

EUROPEAN UNION and G-7

The EU has urged all South China Sea claimants to resolve disputes through peaceful means and "pursue them in accordance with international law," including the U.N. convention. The Group of Seven wealthy nations, which comprises Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.S. and the EU, has called on all states to fully implement decisions binding on them in courts and tribunals provided under the convention.

In June, French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian proposed that European navies coordinate patrols in Asian waters to reinforce a rules-based maritime order. He warned that if the laws of the sea are not respected in that region, they could also be challenged in the Arctic Ocean or Mediterranean Sea.

AUSTRALIA

In January, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said the China-Philippines ruling will be "extremely important" as a statement of international principle and will "settle once and for all" whether artificial reefs are entitled to territorial waters. But Australia has been less outspoken in support of arbitration than the U.S., perhaps mindful of Australia's own resistance to arbitration to resolve its disputed maritime border with tiny East Timor.

INDIA

India has not issued a categorical position on arbitration case, but has been broadly supportive of the application of international law. India shares U.S. concerns about Beijing's rising ambitions in the seas of Asia.

India's External Affairs Ministry says that "all countries must abide by international law and norms on maritime issues." India set an example in 2014 when it accepted a decision by the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration that ruled in favor of Bangladesh in a dispute over the countries' maritime boundary.

JAPAN

Japan was an early supporter of the Philippines' pursuit of arbitration and says both China and the Philippines should abide by the outcome. Japan sees that as upholding international law, but it also reflects concern that historic rival China seeks strategic control of vital sea lanes in the South China Sea that carry 80 percent of Japan's crude oil imports.

Japan's support of third-party dispute resolution is not universal. While it has sought to take its dispute with South Korea over the South Korean-held Dokdo or Takeshima islands to the International Court of Justice, it says no such action is needed in its dispute with China over the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands, which are administered by Japan.

SOUTH KOREA

 Like Japan, South Korea is heavily dependent on fuel imports that pass through the South China Sea, but it has closer ties with China and has been less inclined to speak out. The Foreign Ministry says South China Sea disputes should be resolved under internationally established regulations and that it is "looking with interest" at the Philippine-China arbitration case.

TAIWAN

Taiwan has complained that the tribunal has not solicited its views. While Taipei officially exercises the same nine-dash line claim as Beijing in the South China Sea, it is primarily concerned about Taiping island in the Spratlys. Taiwan administers that remote land feature and is concerned it could be designated as a rock without the rights granted to islands.


Sumber - ABC News

Lack of visitors see Serasa Beach vendors struggle

A picture showing non-operating stalls at Serasa Beach.

Darren Chin
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN

MANY of the 40 stalls at the Serasa Beach Complex are inactive due to the lack of visitors to the beach, despite nearly all the stalls officially having tenants.

A $3.45 million renovation project was completed in March 2014 to provide better facilities, including a permanent building complex, for vendors and visitors to the beach.

Vendors of the stalls said that restrictions brought about by the renovations have put both visitors and vendors off from frequenting Serasa Beach.

Rosmazidah Hj Damit, who has been selling clothing and accessories regularly at her stall at Serasa Beach since the stalls were opened in 2014, said that only around 10 stalls would be open for business on a normal day.

“Lately, the number of visitors to the beach has dropped a lot compared to previous years and I suspect certain restrictions have caused the place to go quiet,” she said.

“For example, if visitors wanted to bring their own barbeque equipment and use it at a place outside the prepared huts, they would be told not to do so and things like these deter people from coming. This ultimately affects us vendors,” she said.

Another vendor who operates a food stall at the beach said some of the aspects of the renovated facilities were not to the liking of local visitors.

“We have heard complaints that the (secondary) parking lot here is too far and the (primary) parking lot next to the stalls does not have enough spaces,” said Khairul Azli Hj Japar.

Khairul Azli said that in the two months before Ramadhan, there would be less than 10 stalls open, even on weekends, due to the lack of visitors.

When contacted by The Brunei Times, an official at the department of parks, recreation and environment said that their records show that currently 38 out of the 40 stalls have tenants.

The official who opted for anonimity for fear of repercussions said that the tenants are all still paying a monthly rent of $15 but do not open their stalls for business, especially during the month of Ramadhan when vendors normally rest.

Meanwhile, Khairul Azli told The Brunei Times that stalls regularly change vendors as tenants not operating their stalls daily would have their tenancy withdrawn.

“We actually have our attendance taken on normal days (before Ramadhan) by the authorities so we were told that if a stall was not operating for a certain number of days in a month, the tenancy of the stalls would be given to a new applicant,” he said.

One vendor who rented out ATVs at Serasa Beach before the renovations said he felt the beach has lost its lustre.

“Serasa Beach used to be a popular destination for locals because it had a fun factor and people could drive all the way in and there were not too many restrictions,” said Abdul Hadi Abdul Sani.

“Bruneians went to Serasa Beach because there were quite a lot of attractions and activities you could do like the ATVs which you can no longer find there,” he said.

Abdul Hadi said many of the vendors previously stationed at Serasa Beach have moved to Tungku Beach as they felt it would be tough to carry out their businesses following the completion of the renovation works.

“In my case, ATV use was banned outright at Serasa Beach which was why I moved to Tungku Beach,” he said.

“I think a lot of the people also stopped going to Serasa Beach and came to Tungku Beach because they were looking for activities and attractions such as the flying fox and ATVs,” he said.

Sumber - The Brunei Times

Gadong wet market woes

Amy (R), a vendor at Gadong wet market, entertaining her customers at her vegetables stall.
Traders at the market have raised concerns over the market’s hygiene

Rosera Mohd
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN

VEGETABLE vendors have expressed concerns over the poor hygiene at the Gadong wet market, saying that the market is infested with rats.

One of the vendors, Norasikin Abdullah, said she had been complaining about the market’s cleanliness to the authorities but hygiene has yet to improve.

“They tried to get rid of the rodents for the whole building once, but that was more than a year ago, the rats are back again,” she said, adding that the rat infestation has been causing inconvenience to the vendors and affects food safety.

“One of the rats ate the tofu I was selling, and I had to throw the whole bucket away because they might be poisonous but who will pay for my losses?” said Norasikin, who has been operating her vegetable business at the market’s first floor since the late 1980s.

She went on to say that the rodents are usually persistent and would eat everything, from pumpkins to squids.

When approached by The Brunei Times yesterday, an officer at the Municipal Department acknowledged the rat infestation problem at the Gadong wet market.

Suhif Hj Abd Rahman, who is in charge of the Gadong wet market, said the department is waiting to hire a new contractor to deal with the rat infestation issue.

“The previous contractor, TermiCam, was in charge of addressing the rat infestation problem, but their term of contract has ended so we are waiting for a new contractor now,” he said.

When asked, Suhif said he was not certain when TermiCam’s contract ended or when the new contractor will be appointed as such contracts are usually dealt by the department’s Maintenance Unit and Technical Services.

He went on to say that Rafi Construction Sdn Bhd has been contracted for cleaning services at the Gadong wet and night markets.

Mohd Arzu Hossin, project manager of Rafi Construction, said the company’s workers clean the Gadong wet market every hour daily.

“Every hour the workers clean the market, wash and sweep the floor, clean the rubbish and use heavy equipment (usually at night) to keep these areas hygienic,” said Mohd Arzu, adding that the company has been cleaning the market for almost three years.

“Fifty workers are deployed to work at markets in Gadong every day with half of them working during the day while the other half at night,” he added.

When asked about the rats at the wet market, he said his company is not tasked by the Municipal Department to handle the rats, but his workers would “manually catch” the rodents whenever they encountered them.

Another vendor who only wished to be known as Amy said the rat infestation meant that vendors can no longer leave their fruits and vegetables at the market.

“Because of these rats, we can’t leave our vegetables here, we have to pack everything up and set up again the next day,” said the 49-year-old.

This is a nuisance as most of the vendors at the market are quite old and working by themselves without any helpers, said Amy, who has been selling at the wet market for about 20 years.

“We have to carry our goods up the stairs back and forth and it takes more than two hours to set up the booth, so it’s quite a burden and not ideal for us at our age,” added the single mother.


Sumber - The Brunei Times

Confronting Threats in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas: Opportunities and Challenges

U.S. and Malaysian ships in the Sulu Sea as part of CARAT 2015

Tackling the manifold problems in the tri-border area will require some heavy lifting by concerned states.

By Prashanth Parameswaran

Too often, headlines about maritime security in the Indo-Pacific tend to focus primarily the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean, mostly because they involve elements of major power competition. And to the extent that other challenges like piracy and trafficking get any attention, the Straits of Malacca is often the focus, given its strategic importance as the world’s most important trade route. The Sulu-Sulawesi Seas, by contrast, received comparatively little scrutiny as a front in Asia’s maritime space until a recent announcement by the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia about trilateral patrols in the area.

Significance

That is unfortunate. Even from a security perspective alone, the Sulu Sea – or, more specifically, the one million square kilometer tri-border area in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas between the southern Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia – is significant. Indeed, arguably no area better captures both the complexity of the region’s manifold maritime security challenges as well as the potential opportunities for greater multilateral cooperation among the states that rely on it.

On the one hand, the Sulu-Sulawesi seas are important to neighboring states and outside stakeholders because they facilitate the cross-border movement of millions of people as well as international navigation. According to one recent estimate by the Indonesian foreign ministry, every year more than 100,000 ships pass through the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas carrying 55 million metric tons of cargo and 18 million passengers.

But the area also presents challenges for the region. The tri-border area, with its porous borders and decades of weak governance, has been ridden with conflict, crime, and poverty, making it a hub for transnational organized crime and terrorist threats. For instance, in the case of the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) main base of operations is in Jolo and Basilan in the Sulu Archipelago, while the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) rebel group’s headquarters is in Mindanao. The area is also at the center of several lingering interstate disputes, be it the Sabah issue between the Philippines and Malaysia or the Ambalat dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Converging Trends

Now, headlines have temporarily thrust the Sulu Sea back in the global limelight. The immediate impetus for cooperation is the recent spate of kidnappings by the ASG involving Malaysian and Indonesian nationals. Though that is far from an uncommon event, the reaction from concerned states appears to have reached a new inflection point this time – at least for now. In particular, the decision by Kuala Lumpur, Manila, and Jakarta to pursue trilateral patrols in the Sulu Sea on the sidelines of the 10th ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in Laos reflects a serious commitment if followed through (See: “Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines Agree on New Joint Patrols Amid Kidnappings”). And to those present at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the outsized attention the issue received also clearly testified to its rising significance

Yet for close observers of Southeast Asian security issues, the context in which this is occurring is in fact much broader and the product of the confluence of several trends. First, individual countries have become more determined about securing their maritime sovereignty and borders as their capacities grow. As I have emphasized before, concerns about lingering interstate disputes and transnational challenges in the maritime domain still inform the ongoing military modernization of the three countries directly involved in the Sulu Sea. Malaysia’s efforts to reinforce the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) in Sabah and Indonesia’s capability upgrades as well as intensified patrolling and monitoring near the Ambalat sea block in the Sulawesi Sea off the east coast of Borneo are just two cases in point (See: “What Does Malaysia’s New Defense Budget for 2016 Mean?”).

Second, threats in that domain have also grown more serious in the past year or two. Though kidnappings have been commonplace, the recent series of incidents in April prompted a rather alarmist response, with Indonesian officials saying that the piracy surge could turn the Sulu Sea into the “new Somalia.” With respect to terrorism, fears of the growing reach of the Islamic State into Southeast Asia – made clear by the Jakarta attacks earlier this year – have also drawn attention once again to the porous borders and ungoverned spaces in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas, much like they did following the September 11 attacks and the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah. Indeed, some have even speculated that ISIS could look to the southern Philippines as a base or territorial foothold in Southeast Asia this year or next. Interstate disputes have also served as irritants from time to time, such as the invasion of Sabah by Philippine militants in 2013, known as the Lahad Datu Incident.

Third and lastly, opportunities have been expanding for greater subregional and extraregional cooperation. Subregionally, even defense ministers from countries surrounding the Sulu Sea now admit that the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP), which commemorate their tenth year in 2016, serve as a good example for what could be possible in the Sulu Sea. Beyond that, the growing interest of external powers in the region could also offer other avenues for cooperation. For instance, in the midst of the Shangri-La Dialogue and in between the bilateral phases of the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises that Washington does with the Malaysian and Philippine militaries, the U.S., Philippine, and Malaysian navies conducted a coordinated multilateral training activity in the Sulu Sea on June 4. As I have indicated previously, the move reflects the U.S. view that the Sulu Sea is one promising avenue through which Washington can pursue multilateralization with its Southeast Asian partners (See: “The Other Sea That Dominated Asia’s Security Summit in 2016”)

Opportunities

Addressing the challenges in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas requires a multi-pronged and multilateral effort. On the security side, the initiative that has dominated the headlines in recent months is the proposal for trilateral patrols between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In May, the foreign ministers and armed forces chiefs of the three countries met in Indonesia and issued a joint declaration that included a list of measures to begin operationalizing these patrols – which would be either coordinated or joint – including establishing a national focal point and hotline of communication facilitate coordination and intelligence-sharing (See: “Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines Agree on New Joint Patrols Amid Kidnappings”). The idea is to emulate the successful Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP), which reduced incidents of piracy and sea robbery in those waters.

While this is promising, such initiatives must be complemented by stringent efforts at the national level. Without the Philippines decimating the top leadership of the ASG in the southern Philippines or Malaysia cracking down more effectively on corruption within its security services, such illicit activities are likely to persist. After all, the strength of any sort of collective mechanism – be it coordinated patrols or intelligence-sharing – rests on the effectiveness of the individual participants.

And though security initiatives like patrols or armed operations can mitigate the challenges in the area, eradicating them entirely will require political and economic measures that get at their root causes. That means addressing the conflict, crime, and poverty within the tri-border area that either opens up space or drives support for illicit activities. In the southern Philippines, for instance, it would help if the incoming Duterte government could make progress on implementing a historic agreement with the MILF, inked under President Benigno Aquino III’s tenure, to end a decades-long insurgency, thereby providing an opportunity to facilitate stability and boost the local economy.

Economic initiatives can also help alleviate inequalities and address underdevelopment, which can fuel narratives of injustice and lead disaffected individuals to turn to nefarious activities. Apart from efforts taken by individual states, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, and Manila should also look to bolster inter-state collaboration to assist each other where possible. While new measures could be considered, countries can also utilize existing subregional and regional mechanisms as well such as the Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines – East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). The Philippines has an opportunity to shape such multilateral endeavors as both the chair of BIMP-EAGA beginning September 2016 and the chair of ASEAN starting January 2017.

Challenges

Seasoned observers know that realizing all of this this will not be easy. On the military front, Philippine officials repeatedly stress the difficulty of rooting out the ASG due to serious problems ranging from the terrain to a lack of capabilities and manpower. Getting at root causes is also a heavy lift, and it is unclear if there is sufficient political will in various capitals to undertake efforts that will be controversial among either certain government bureaucracies or some segments of the population.

Once initiatives become bilateral or multilateral, additional complexities present themselves. Take the example of the proposed trilateral patrols. For one, remaining disputes between the countries could complicate cooperation. From Indonesia’s public concern about Malaysian incursions in the Ambalat block to incoming Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte’s suggestion that he could pursue Manila’s claim to Sabah, these issues do not seem to be going away anytime soon. Politics aside, there are also the operational challenges of getting these patrols underway, which these countries recognize. Getting to effective trilateral patrols requires resolving nettlesome questions around the nature of these patrols (whether joint or coordinated); the standard operating procedures that will govern them; and the necessary supporting infrastructure (in the case of the MSP, they were buttressed by other mechanisms, including air patrols and a formal intelligence sharing platform).


All this does not mean that one should pour cold water over the recent uptick in subregional and extraregional cooperation in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas, which has long been needed. But it does suggest that given the multitude of threats that exist and the challenges inherent in tackling them individually and jointly, managing this tri-border area is likely to remain a problem for the foreseeable future.


Sumber - The Diplomat

NCB makes 3,464 arrests in 5 years

Rasidah HAB
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN

THE Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) made a total of 3,464 drug arrests in the past five years, with unemployed people making up the majority of offenders.

NCB’s statistics from 2010 to 2015 showed that 56.8 per cent of individuals arrested for drug violations were jobless.

A total of 416 unemployed people were caught for drug offences last year, compared to 347 in 2014.

NCB also arrested 109 students for drug violations from 2010 to 2015, it said in a statement to The Brunei Times.

The figures also indicated that 575 Bruneians were caught for drug offences last year, up from 501 in the preceding year.

There was also a higher number (832) of private sector employees who were arrested for drug offences compared to 281 civil servants for the past five years.

The bureau said 93 per cent (3,256) of the arrests were made under Section 6(b) for consumption of controlled drug.

Despite more Bruneians caught for substance abuse, NCB said the drug situation in the country is “under control” compared to other countries in the region.

“Drug-related arrests constitute only 0.15 per cent of Brunei’s total population in 2013 and 0.14 per cent in 2014 (population of 411,900),” the bureau added.

Some of the drug offences included trafficking a controlled drug, possession of controlled drugs for the purpose of trafficking, import and export of controlled drugs, possession of utensils for consumption of controlled drugs and cultivation of cannabis, opium and coca plants.

Syabu or methamphetamine is still the most consumed drugs in Brunei for the past five years, followed by cannabis, nimetazepam, ketamine, ecstasy and inhalants.

NCB went on to say that it continues to strengthen border security even though there had been no cases of international drug syndicate couriers arrested in Brunei since 2014. The bureau said it is working with other law enforcement agencies to step up control at border checkpoints to monitor any drug trafficking activities.

“Measures are taken through efforts in the gathering of intelligence and conducting operational activities at targeted areas based on the information gathered.

“This includes joint operations conducted with other law enforcement agencies,” the bureau said.

It added that preventive drug awareness programmes to the public are carried out, while a supervision scheme had been implemented to guide and counsel recovering drug users and to reintegrate them into the society. NCB also provides treatment and rehabilitation programmes at Al-Islah Rehabilitation Centre through its therapeutic community programme that focuses on behavioural change.


Sumber - The Brunei Times

What a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone Means for Southeast Asia

It mainly means an ominous development

Speculation is growing that China will soon declare an Air Defense Identification Zone over parts or all of the South China Sea. It is the most likely response to an unfavorable ruling in the case challenging China’s claims in the South China Sea.

In anticipation of the verdict in the next few weeks, many are already speaking up to try and stay Beijing from making such declaration. US Secretary of State John Kerry warned Beijing that such a move would be “provocative and destabilizing.”

For its part China dropped hints it is thinking along those lines. “If the U.S. military makes provocative moves to challenge Chinese sovereignty in the region, it would give Beijing a good opportunity to declare an ADIZ,” said a source quoted in local media.

China’s first such defense zone, which it declared in November 2013 over a part of the East China Sea, was generally considered to be a response to Tokyo’s decision to nationalize the disputed Senkaku islands, which China calls the Daiyou Islands.

So what would a new Chinese ADIZ mean for Southeast Asia?

Boundaries. Much would depend on the boundaries that Beijing chooses to declare. One could be a large circle around the Spratlys, another circle around the Paracels, or both, or possibly even one that approximates the nine-dash line that Manila is challenging in court.

Beijing could also declare a defense identification zone along its southern coast and Hainan Island. That would make good defensive sense as China has many naval bases in this region. However, it would not serve to protest the tribunal’s expected verdict.

In such a zone, airlines are supposed to file flight plans with the claiming authority, maintain open radio contact and respond to inquiries. If they don’t answer, fighter aircraft are scrambled to investigate and conceivably force the aircraft to land.

A glance at the map would show how a zone over the Spratly’s would impact airline traffic in the South China Sea. A Spratlys zone would sit directly in the path of flights from Manila to Jakarta or Singapore, for example.

The East China Seas air defense identification zone that Beijing announced in 2013 covers only a part of the offshore waters, though a portion of it covered the Senkaku/Daioyus. Much of mainland China was untouched.

Historically, countries that have declared air defense zones, such as the United States or Japan, have done so for the entire coastline, not just pieces of it. That brings into question exactly what was its purpose?

Washington famously flew a pair of bombers through the zone after it was declared (and is likely to do so again if China declares a new one). On the other hand, it advised American civilian airlines to comply with the rules. According to the Chinese, 55 airlines from 19 countries traverse the zone.

China does not seem to be strictly enforcing the current East China Sea zone. By some accounts it has actually stopped enforcing it, although it is difficult to tell, as China does not publish figures on fighter scrambles.

To date no Japanese airline has been harassed, even though, at the urging of the government, they do not file flight plans with China.

Only one incident occurred in 2015 when Chinese authorities turned back a Lao Airlines Flight. But it was determined that it had not received permission to overfly the mainland on its way to Vientiane.

“It had nothing to do with the ADIZ”, Beijing said.

Enforcement.  Whether China will enforce any of its new ADIZs or essentially do nothing will depend a lot on the given situation, especially the impending decision of the tribunal, plus the number of fighter assets that can be deployed to the new Spratly bases.

The Chinese already have fighters stationed on islands in the Paracels in the northern part of the South China Sea that could be scrambled to engage with any suspicious flights. They can also depend on fighters stationed on Hainan Island.

Of course, China has already been building bases on several of the marine features in the Spratlys it claims as Chinese territorial waters. A couple of them now have airstrips long enough to handle high performance aircraft, potentially rotated from the mainland.

For the present, this contingency remains theoretical, as China has not yet dispatched any jet fighters to the Spratly bases. It claims the features, including a large lighthouse, are for protection of civilian marine commerce and uses as typhoon shelters.

However, fully developed military airfields, would “create a mechanism in which China would have de facto control over the South China Sea in any scenario short of war,” says the outspoken commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Adm. Harry Harris.

Legalities.  If China should declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea, there isn’t much that anyone can do about it except to sputter in impotence. Secretary Kerry can complain all he wants that the move is “provocative and destabilizing,” to no avail.

There is no arbitration tribunal, no Security Council to appeal to. ADIZ’s are not seriously governed by any international agreements. No law requires advanced notice for declaring such a zone. All declared ADIZs, including the United States, have been unilateral.

There is no law that says countries must obey them, though most countries do. Russia is an important exception. It doesn’t recognize anybody’s ADIZ and flies through them without a by-your leave. That is why, until recently, most Japanese fighter scrambles have been against Russian intruders rather than Chinese.

Taiwan’s new defense minister recently announced that Taipei will not recognize any new ADIZ declared in the South China Sea (where Taipei has its own claims.)

Air defense zones are basically relics of the early Cold War when long-range Russian bombers were the main threat. They are obsolete in the age of intercontinental missiles. The US imposed its own ADIZ as far back as 1950 and has not lifted it.

It is worth remembering that the first Chinese ADIZ covers only a portion of the country’ coastline, which brings into question whether they are meant serve any real defensive purpose, but are mainly counters in the ongoing struggle over who controls the East and South China Seas.


Sumber - Asia Sentinel

China sekat minoriti daripada berpuasa

BEIJING, 6 Jun – China telah menandakan permulaan Ramadan dengan tegahan lazimnya ke atas kakitangan awam, para pelajar dan kanak-kanak di rantau Islam itu daripada ikut serta berpuasa, menurut laman web kerajaan ketika bulan suci bermula hari ini.

Parti pemerintah Komunis China berfahaman ateis dan selama bertahun-tahun telah menegah kakitangan kerajaan dan kanak-kanak daripada berpuasa di Xinjiang, rumah kepada lebih 10 juta puak minoriti Islam Uighur. Ia juga mengarahkan restoran-restoran untuk beroperasi seperti biasa.

Rantau itu sering melihat pertempuran biasa antara puak Uighur dan pasukan keselamatan kerajaan, dan Beijing telah menyalahkan serangan maut di sana dan tempat lain di China ke atas militan yang mencari kebebasan bagi rantau sumber kaya itu.

Kumpulan hak asasi kemanusiaan menyalahkan ketegangan ke atas pengehadan beragama dan budaya yang dikenakan terhadap Uighur dan minoriti Islam lain di kawasan luas terbentang, yang bersempadan dengan Asia Tengah.

Beberapa jabatan kerajaan di Xinjiang menyiarkan makluman dalam laman web mereka pada minggu lalu mengarahkan penyekatan berpuasa semasa Ramadan.

“Anggota parti, kader, kakitangan awam, para pelajar dan kanak-kanak tidak perlu berpuasa pada Ramadan dan tidak mengambil bahagian dalam kegiatan keagamaan,” menurut notis yang disiarkan pada Khamis pada laman web bandar Korla, tengah Xinjiang.

“Semasa bulan Ramadan, perniagaan makanan dan minuman tidak akan ditutup,” tambahnya. – AFP


Sumber - Media Permata