Myanmar’s Rohingya plight faces jihadist hijacking

Author: Iftekharul Bashar, NTU

On 9 October 2016, 200 armed attackers from the Aqa Mul Mujahidin — an organisation with links to the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) — carried out a surprise attack on Myanmar’s police at the Maungdaw border, killing 9 police officers. The attackers were from Myanmar’s northern Rakhine (Arakan) State. They seized weapons, ammunition, bayonets and magazines. According to the Myanmar government, the attackers received funding and support from foreign terrorist organisations.

Since the attacks in October, heavy-handed counter-insurgency campaigns have begun and reports have emerged of serious human rights abuses. Myanmar soldiers have been accused of killing Rohingyas and burning their villages, but the government has denied these allegations. The state media has put the death toll at almost 100 people, although advocacy groups claim that more have been killed. More than 20,000 Rohingyas have fled to neighbouring Bangladesh in the past two months.

The Rohingyas are denied citizenship and viewed by the Myanmar government as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Tens of thousands of internally displaced Rohingyas, following ethnic violence in 2012, live in decrepit camps where travel is restricted. Following regional and international protests, an emergency ASEAN meeting was held in early December to discuss the crisis.

The plight of the Rohingya minority has attracted the attention of regional and international extremist and terrorist groups.

The so-called Islamic State (IS) has expressed its intention to target Myanmar via Bangladesh. In the fourteenth issue of its propaganda magazine Dabiq, a Bangladeshi jihadist called on others to join him to help the oppressed Rohingyas. Aung San Suu Kyi was also singled out by IS as a possible target in a ‘kill list’ sent to Malaysian police in August. In November 2016, Indonesian police thwarted an attempt by a local pro-IS extremist group to carry out a bombing attack on the Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta.

If IS were to firmly establish a foothold in Bangladesh, it would not be difficult for the group to expand its operations into Myanmar. The porous border between Bangladesh and Myanmar provides suitable terrain for insurgent operations. Should IS declare a new wilayat in South Asia, it is likely to include Myanmar’s Rakhine State. IS may capitalise on its contacts with the Bangladeshi militant group known as Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), which already has a pro-IS faction.

Al Qaeda has also shown interest in the Rohingya issue. Al Qaeda’s South Asia chapter, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), listed Myanmar as one of its key targets in 2014. Abu Zar al-Burmi, a key Pakistani Taliban leader of Burmese origin, condemned Myanmar’s new government for failing to protect Rohingyas and called for armed jihad. A new AQIS magazine released in September 2016, Al Balagh, also urged Muslims to join their fight against oppression. Through its Bangladeshi affiliate, the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), Al Qaeda has provided training and support for the Rohingya militants and maintained ties with RSO. More recently, on 10 December 2016 al-Qaeda’s Bengali media platform (known as Titumir Media) has released a video in Bengali calling for taking revenge of the persecution of the Arakan Muslims through an armed struggle.

In cyberspace, regional online extremists have sought to capitalise on the issue, pledging their support through profile pictures with the IS flag and the hashtag ‘Pray for P_A_R_I_S’ which refers to the conflict areas of Palestine, Africa, Rohingya areas, Iraq and Syria. Online extremists in Indonesia have expressed a desire to mount ‘jihad’ on behalf of the Rohingyas and made reference to their hopes of bringing the ‘mujahidin’ (jihadi fighters) into Myanmar. These online jihadist flare-ups suggest that the Rohingya issue is being hijacked by global jihadism.

A group that has recently emerged is Harakah al-Yaqin, or the Movement of Certainty, which is said to consist of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh who crossed the border into northern Rakhine State. Videos of the group first surfaced on the internet in October 2016. The men spoke in a mixture of Bengali, Arakanese and Arabic and were armed with AK-47s. They called on foreign Rohingyas and jihadists to join them in northern Rakhine State to resist Myanmar’s forces. The existence of Harakah al-Yaqin may lead to an escalation of conflict in the region between the Rohingyas and Myanmar’s armed forces.

The RSO, who have been blamed by the Myanmar government for recent violent attacks, is a little-known militant group with an active regional and international presence. Based in Karachi, its members also operate in countries in the Middle East, Bangladesh and India. A significant faction of RSO has close operational ties with fundamentalist extremist and terrorist groups, namely Laskar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, Indian Mujahideen in India and JMB in Bangladesh. Some of the RSO’s leaders received combat training in Pakistan and are active along the Bangladesh–Myanmar border.

Active networks of IS, as well as AQIS, currently pose a threat to Myanmar’s security. A festering Rohingya crisis will create opportunities for exploitation by regional and international terror groups. Myanmar must develop a robust counter-terrorism strategy and beef up its counter-terrorism intelligence to enable authorities to prevent future attacks.

It will also have to bring the Rohingya community on board as strategic partners to alert authorities of terrorist or insurgent activities and to facilitate conflict resolution. Myanmar must begin to manage relations between the Buddhists and Muslims in the country. The government must urgently address the plight of this impoverished minority as they struggle to fulfil their basic needs.


Sumber - East Asia Forum

Waspada anasir anti keamanan, ancaman siber

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, 1 Jan – Kebawah Duli Yang Maha Mulia Paduka Seri Baginda Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah, Sultan dan Yang Di-Pertuan Negara Brunei Darussalam bertitah mengingatkan rakyat agar berwaspada dengan anasir-anasir anti keamanan dan ketenteraman tidak pernah lupa untuk mengeruhkan keadaan.

“Keamanan adalah penting, kerana tanpa keamanan, pembangunan tidak akan dapat dilaksanakan. Oleh itu, rukun keamanan, mustahaklah dipelihara dan diamalkan iaitu memegang kuat ajaran agama, mematuhi undang-undang serta hidup dalam keadaan harmoni dan bersatu padu. Inilah rahsia keamanan itu.

“Mereka tidak pernah sealiran tujuan dengan kita. Kerana itu kita perlu berhati-hati terhadap mereka itu. Ini adalah tanggungjawab besar semua pihak, terutama, siapa yang secara khusus ada berkaitan dengan keselamatan,” titah Baginda Sempena Menyambut Awal Tahun Baru Masihi 2017 yang disiarkan secara langsung menerusi RTB malam tadi.

Baginda bertitah, usaha-usaha juga perlu diambil untuk menghadapi ancaman yang datangnya daripada dunia siber dan media sosial, termasuk juga untuk memperkukuh lagi perkongsian strategik dengan institusi-institusi keselamatan siber antarabangsa.

Dari sudut ekonomi, titah Baginda, dunia kita masih saja mengalami keadaan ekonomi yang tidak menentu. Namun kita bersyukur dengan langkah-langkah pembaharuan yang diambil serta pendekatan ‘whole-of-nation’, maka dapatlah kita menyaksikan peningkatan kedudukan negara dalam ‘ease of doing business’, sebagaimana laporan oleh Bank Dunia.

Baginda Sultan ketika berkenan mengurniakan titah Sempena
Menyambut Awal Tahun Baru Masihi 2017 di Istana Nurul Iman

“Pencapaian ini terhasil daripada komitmen dan kerjasama erat di antara agensi-agensi kerajaan dan lain-lain pihak yang berkepentingan. Namun kita tidak wajar untuk cepat berpuas hati, tetapi sebaliknya perlu lebih aktif dan lebih tinggi semangat pada meningkatkan lagi pencapaian tersebut,” titah Baginda lagi.

Seperti yang berlaku di mana-mana, jelas Baginda, kita juga mempelawa pelabur-pelabur langsung asing untuk melabur di negara ini.

“Pada setakat ini alhamdulillah, beberapa Pelaburan Langsung Asing (FDI) telah pun mula bertapak di negara ini, manakala pelbagai program dan inisiatif juga ada dirancang dan dilaksanakan bagi membantu golongan peniaga dan pengusaha tempatan, terutama pengusaha kecil dan sederhana atau MSME. Ini adalah satu harapan, bahawa ekonomi negara sedang dipacu, untuk menjadikannya berdaya tahan,” titah Baginda.

Bertitah mengenai Perkhidmatan Awam di negara ini, Baginda ingin melihat ia terus meningkat dan produktif.

“Beta percaya masih banyak lagi yang boleh diperbaiki, terutama mengenai penerapan nilai-nilai utama dalam Perkhidmatan Awam. Beta mahu supaya jentera kerajaan kaya dengan disiplin dan kaya dengan amanah dalam menjalankan tugas, sebagai cara untuk kita meraih berkat dalam perkhidmatan,” titah Baginda.

Mengenai bidang pendidikan titah Baginda, “Usaha adalah sedang dibuat untuk memperluaskan saliran pendidikan, di samping mempertingkatkan kualiti bagi mencapai Wawasan Brunei 2035.

“Keutamaan ialah memperkasa kualiti guru untuk menjadikan mereka itu individu-individu pendidik yang berprestasi tinggi. Di arena antarabangsa, kita akan sentiasa memainkan peranan positif ke arah kesejahteraan dan keamanan serantau mahupun global.

“Secara jujur, kita mengharapkan supaya ASEAN akan terus kekal menjadi pertubuhan serantau yang sentiasa dihormati kerana prinsip-prinsipnya yang jelas untuk kebajikan.

“Pada tahun 2017 ini, kita akan merayakan ulang tahun ASEAN ke-50, adalah diharapkan supaya kerjasama yang baik akan terus berlangsung di antara negara-negara ahli ASEAN, demi untuk kepentingan Wawasan Komuniti ASEAN 2025,” titah Baginda.

Terdahulu Baginda bertitah, bersyukur ke hadrat Allah Subhanahu Wata’ala, kerana dengan izin-Nya jua, kita kini sedang melangkah ke ambang Tahun Baharu Masihi 2017.

Titah Baginda, kita akan me-ninggalkan Tahun 2016 dengan seribu kenangan, di antaranya ialah kenangan manis dapat menikmati keamanan dan kemakmuran di negara yang bertuah ini.

Maka untuk itu titah Baginda, marilah kita sama-sama merafakkan syukur serta doa, semoga keadaan yang seperti ini akan dapat pula dinikmati dalam tahun 2017.


Sumber - Media Permata

KENYATAAN RASMI PRESIDEN NDP MENGENAI ISU KEZALIMAN TERHADAP UMAT ISLAM ROHINGYA

Baca atau muat turun kenyataan rasmi Presiden NDP (format pdf) di pautan berikut,

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2OXPABIfo1gc0VuRUdqclJWLW8/view?usp=sharing

South China Sea dispute: Will Indonesia play a bigger role in Asean?

An Indonesian navy vessel (foreground) next to a Chinese Coast Guard vessel near
the Natuna Islands. Indonesia is the only Asean country that China has refrained
from dispute-escalation with in the South China Sea.

By Johannes Nugroho

The late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once defined consensus as “something in which no one believes and to which no one objects”.

That would describe the approach of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean), at its recent Summit in Laos, when it comes to the South China Sea territorial disputes.

Although the adoption of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (Cues) in the South China Sea may signal that Asean and China have taken initial steps to build trust and confidence amid growing tensions, it is unlikely to work wonders.

China did not accept an international tribunal ruling on its claims in the South China Sea based on a legally binding convention such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, to which it is a signatory.

Why would it care about a non-binding agreement such as Cues?

The question remains whether Asean can maintain credibility if it fails to resolve a major flashpoint in its own backyard.

Logic dictates that Asean must somehow enact a more coherent set of working methods and understanding, both internally for its own members and externally to deal with China and other non-Asean parties.

To do so, Indonesia’s leadership is paramount. As a founding member of Asean and its traditional status as “first among equals”, Indonesia is well-placed to set the tone for the other member states.

Apart from its size, Indonesia is the only Asean country that China has refrained from dispute-escalation with in the South China Sea.

Chinese Coast Guard vessels did not hesitate to ram Vietnamese boats in 2014 in the standoff between both sides over China’s deployment of an oil-drilling rig in waters near Vietnam’s coast. China’s aggression towards the Philippines in the Spratly Islands is also well-documented.

In contrast, no retaliatory action was taken by China in the aftermath of the June incursion by a fleet of Chinese vessels into the Natuna Sea, to which the Indonesian navy responded by firing at and apprehending one vessel.

To defend its sovereignty over the Natuna Sea vis-a-vis a superior power such as China, Indonesia will need the collective strength of Asean and other like-minded member states.

Some may argue that getting Indonesia to play a bigger role in Asean on the South China Sea issue may not be easy.

The country’s engagement with Asean has waned since the fall of President Suharto in 1998. Increasing complexity in domestic populist politics and budgetary constraints in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have all produced a more inward-looking country with a less confident footing in regional geopolitics. To date, no ministerial blueprint on the South China Sea issue exists.

The election of the domestically popular President Joko Widodo has prompted very little change. Early in his presidency, Mr Widodo showed little interest in Asean diplomacy. Under his sink-the-boat policy for captured illegal foreign fishing vessels, the vessels originating from Asean countries such as Vietnam and Thailand bore the brunt first. The Indonesian government only destroyed its first Chinese vessel in 2015. Interestingly, the vessel in question had already been impounded in 2009.

But there are signs that things could be changing.

First, while China has repeatedly affirmed Indonesia’s claim to the Natuna Islands, it has argued that the overlapping waters are “China’s historical fishing ground”.

So when three incursions by Chinese fishing vessels occurred in the Natuna Sea this year — all supported and escorted by Chinese Coast Guard units — Jakarta must have realised that its avowed status as a “non-party” and an “honest broker” in the South China Sea disputes was no longer tenable.

Jakarta has since replaced its coast guard around the Natunas with naval ships and announced plans for a military buildup and economic development in the area, as outlined in its 2016 State Defence Paper and maritime policy.

Mr Widodo is now also more cognisant of Asean’s centrality to Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts. His active participation at the recent Asean Summit — where he called for Asean unity — may signal a change of heart. Mr Widodo also discussed the South China Sea issue with both Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte during their recent visits to Jakarta.

Faced with China’s unprecedented challenge in the Natuna Sea, Mr Widodo will need all the help he can muster, including insights from his fellow Asean leaders from the Philippines and Vietnam, which face similar territorial disputes with China, as well as from Singapore, which has significant economic and cultural ties with Beijing and is the country coordinator for Asean-China ties.

The Philippines, set to take the Asean chair next year, should welcome and support Indonesia’s increased regional engagement. President Widodo told the Indonesian press that he and President Duterte have a lot in common.

The fact that the subsequent misunderstanding over what the latter told the former about the fate of the Filipina on death row in Indonesia, Mary Jane Veloso, was quickly smoothed out points to a workable relationship between the two.

China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea has proved to be one of the most polarising issues that Asean has faced in recent years, testing its core function as the regional forum for conflict resolution.

It is important that Indonesia pulls its weight within Asean to prevent the association’s plunge into irrelevance.

Vietnam’s unease at the situation is already palpable. At a recent lecture in Singapore, Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang spoke against the “‘might makes right’ mindset”, clearly with China in mind.

Bearing in mind that Vietnam is already looking beyond Asean in its security stratagem, such as forging closer defence ties with India through their collaboration on the BrahMos missile system, the urgency of Asean unity is beyond doubt.

Let us hope that Indonesia, working alongside the other founding members, could pave the way to a consensus that everyone can work with and that no one objects to.


Sumber - TODAYonline

Is ASEAN about to fracture?

Author: Editors, East Asia Forum

President Obama is on his final trip to Asia as president for the G20 summit in Hangzhou in China and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Vientiane, Laos. Leaders of Asia Pacific nations, including some of the largest and most powerful in the world — eight of them G20 members — will meet in Vientiane because Laos is the chair of ASEAN in 2016.

The ten Southeast Asian nations making up ASEAN will also hold their summit in Vientiane, almost as a sideshow alongside the EAS. Yet they are there because ASEAN is at the centre of Asian regionalism and regional cooperation. The ASEAN grouping celebrates its 50th anniversary next year and continues to defy the odds on falling apart. Conceived for geostrategic reasons, it has been pronounced dead or useless countless times while it still plays a key role in managing major power relationships in Asia and across the Pacific.

ASEAN is very much greater than the sum of its parts. At its best, when unified and on message, it projects the interests of 625 million people from a diverse set of countries ranging from some of the richest and most technologically advanced to some of the poorest countries in Asia and globally. Collectively it is a larger destination for US direct investment than China or Japan.

When divisions appear amongst the ASEAN ten — as has been happening again of late — or progress on economic integration lags behind deadlines — which is the norm — ASEAN looks more like a passenger than the driver of Asian regionalism.

Because China and Japan (and South Korea) are plagued by political squabbles, the ASEAN plus three grouping including ASEAN’s three Northeast Asian neighbours has been useful for promoting broader regional economic and political cooperation. Australia, India and New Zealand, who are all in the neighbourhood and have strong interests in East Asia, build off the plus three and are part of the broader ASEAN plus six grouping. This was initiated in part by Japan’s desire to have more like-minded countries included in the East Asian arrangement. The East Asia Summit was set up to include the United States so Russia had to be brought in too. That ASEAN provides the venue for these powers to get face time is an achievement in itself, even though it could do more to set the agenda and progress Asian and trans-Pacific cooperation.

ASEAN has been successful in helping to institutionalise major power relations in Southeast Asia and in defining the role that great powers play, while giving voice to smaller states. A weakened ASEAN would put all that at risk.

Since the end of the Cold War the economic impact of ASEAN has been more important than its geopolitical impact. A necessary condition for ASEAN to thrive is for its members to deepen economic integration primarily as a base for the broader Asian supply chains that drive trade and economic growth in the regional economy.

The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was launched at the end of 2015. It’s an ongoing project towards a single market that has a long way to go and requires member states to commit to and deliver on difficult reforms — something not many have shown the willingness to do in recent years. Doing so collectively will help expand the benefits of regional integration but it is a slow process and the headwinds of anti-globalisation in the rest of the world are not going to make it faster. Much of the region is still very poor or at risk of becoming stuck in a middle-income trap, unable to deliver high incomes. Lifting living standards, and doing so while reducing inequality, is a top priority in ASEAN economies.

The AEC sets the right agenda to achieve that — a gift for which many regions would be grateful. The rapid growth of East Asia in the second half of the 20th century was inclusive; now Asia must return to inclusive growth in order to sustain its future development.

ASEAN once again faces existential threats to its unity and centrality as Mathew Davies explains in this week’s lead essay. It faces the external pressure of ‘rival Chinese and US ambitions’, internal tensions, and questions of legitimacy in the eyes of its people, according to Davies.

Davies says ‘[n]either the United States nor China seem willing to make ASEAN unity a strategic goal’. That’s because it’s easier to ‘harness ASEAN, unified or not, for their own ambitions’. It’s easier to deal with individual member nations and the result is that some align with Washington, others with Beijing and most hedge between both.

The South China Sea tensions have exposed these divisions. It does not help that Indonesia, ASEAN’s biggest member, has shown a tendency to ‘drift away from multilateralism towards a more bilateral and global heavyweight role’, as Davies explains. Indonesia dominates ASEAN in terms of size and is ASEAN’s only G20 member, but has been inclined under its current President, Joko Widodo, to pursue its own interests independently of the ASEAN group.

Former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating last week called for Australia to join the ASEAN grouping in the context of managing its relationships between the United States and China. Keating’s call suggests that in the midst of these emerging divisions, ASEAN must be doing something right.

ASEAN’s inability to take sides between the United States and China as a group, whether on the South China Sea or other issues, may frustrate many. That same strategic incoherence, however, can be a useful buffer between the superpowers even if it does little to broker cooperation and avoid conflict between them. The risk is that ASEAN, betwixt and between, becomes divided and fractures.

China is a larger economic partner than the United States for all ASEAN members. Many but not all of the ASEAN countries rely on the United States for security from a rising China. That certainly complicates affairs but does not make them unmanageable.

Though ASEAN’s potential is huge, it’s true that it has never fulfilled the more optimistic expectations for its role in the region. It has nonetheless played a critical geopolitical and geo-economic role.

ASEAN remains a force for keeping markets open in Asia, lifting the living standards of its 625 million people, acting as a facilitator of cooperation between major powers, reducing the risk of conflict in the Asia Pacific and bringing coherence to Asian arrangements. ASEAN’s greatest proponents would be shy of owning these lofty goals. But the continued existence of ASEAN itself is still critical to achieving them.


Sumber - East Asia Forum

ASEAN and China at a crossroads after South China Sea ruling

Author: Sourabh Gupta, ICAS

Almost 30 years to the day that a young, Harvard-trained American lawyer won a famous judgment at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States, Paul S Reichler pulled off another momentous victory at The Hague. This time the judgment was against China for having breached its international treaty obligations in the South China Sea.

Washington refused to honour the 1986 award, citing Managua’s selective application of the law, the highly charged political nature of the case and the ICJ’s overreach in asserting jurisdiction. Later that year, it cast the sole veto against a UN Security Council draft resolution calling for full and immediate compliance with the judgment. China was one of 11 states on the Council to vote in favour.

Beijing now restates each of the accusations made by the defence that day. Yet one hopes that it will set a better example of compliance than Washington. It is also in its enlightened self-interest to do so.

China’s emerging policy approach is one of non-acceptance of the award while supporting escalation control on the ground. This is coupled with an offer to negotiate with the Philippines. The political cost–benefit calculus underlying this policy will gradually but decisively shift against China with each passing month — especially as Manila forces the issue in order to collect the benefits conferred by the award.

Hanoi too stands poised to force claims that it enjoys traditional fishing rights within the territorial sea of the Paracel Islands. It can also claim, pointing to the award, that none of the high-tide features there are fully entitled islands, and that, as a result, the features cannot generate their own exclusive economic zones (EEZs).

China’s favoured ‘dual-track’ approach holds that disputes should be resolved through talks between directly concerned parties, while China and ASEAN countries should jointly pursue stability in the South China Sea. In light of the ruling, China must discreetly implement an ‘early harvest’ set of compliant actions within this ‘dual-track’ framework. These could include allowing re-entry of Filipino traditional fishermen to the territorial sea of the Scarborough Shoal and China withdrawing its paramilitary presence from the Second Thomas Shoal area.

Beijing should also seize this opportunity to clarify the geographic limits of its ‘relevant waters’ claim in the South China Sea and the functional nature of the ‘historic right’ of access that it seeks in these waters.

ASEAN too must brace for the implications of the award, particularly on the security front. The decision to annul all extended maritime claims associated with China’s land features on the Philippines’ continental shelf is effectively an endorsement of a 2009 submission filed by Malaysia and Vietnam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. That submission also implied that none of the features in the Spratlys group were capable of generating EEZs or continental shelf rights.

That filing took China by surprise and touched off a protest note featuring the nine-dash line. The Tribunal’s ruling will encounter a similar, if not greater show of resolve by Beijing, both on the table and at sea.

Sovereignty-linked issues of jurisdiction have always been tied to a larger political calculus of stability and good neighbourliness. China’s rulers have not been shy in calibrating their stance between a hardline and a flexible one to suit the strategic circumstances at hand. Should Philippine ‘armed forces’ or ‘public vessels’ provide escort to private efforts to restart oil and gas development on its continental shelf, the United States could be drawn into the line of fire. This would have cascading implications for peace and stability in the South China Sea.

The Tribunal’s award brings into question the call to expeditiously conclude a China–ASEAN ‘Code of Conduct’ (COC). The area of application of the COC’s rules was premised on the existence of unresolved maritime boundary areas of concerned parties in the South China Sea. Having produced a de facto delimitation of the China–Philippines maritime boundary (and furnished principles for the China–Vietnam one too), the Tribunal has effectively undercut the raison d’être that sustains the envisaged code.

Both ASEAN and China would be better off reframing their COC interactions to a trimmed-down dialogue on preventive mechanisms that set and stabilise the rules of engagement and communication for their paramilitaries. Such a code could be framed along the lines of the multinational Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea.

The scope for functional cooperation in the South China Sea has been set back in no uncertain terms. Had Itu Aba been ruled a fully entitled island, it could have facilitated a basis for oil and gas joint development in the overlapping water areas. With no geographic overlap to contend with, China’s principle of ‘shelving differences and seeking joint development’ has become a hollow slogan. There are no differences of entitled rights left to shelve.

The contours of functional cooperation will need to evolve from bilateral actions to subregional activities in cross-cutting areas. Such activities could include environmental protection, maritime search and rescue, and cooperation against piracy and transnational crime.

The arbitration has ripped apart the deliberate ambiguity that has at times helpfully spurred the search for win–win solutions to the region’s overlapping challenges at its peripheries. Yet another Asian frontier has now been transformed, to quote Lord Curzon, into a ‘razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace’. The tenuous quiet in the immediate wake of the award will not last.

As China and ASEAN gingerly mould a ‘new normal’ in the South China Sea, they stand at an important crossroads. They can either advocate for exclusivist answers to the challenges in their designated maritime zones — the littoral states’ preference. Or they can throw their weight behind comprehensive and overarching cooperative frameworks — China’s preference — that secure peace and stability. Whatever their chosen path, China and ASEAN must first form an important consensus on this point. Papering over this choice will be harder than papering over the language in their summit communiques. Muddling through is not an option.


Sumber - East Asia Forum

ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement

BY MANUEL MOGATO, MICHAEL MARTINA AND BEN BLANCHARD

Southeast Asian nations failed to agree on maritime disputes in the South China Sea on Sunday after Cambodia blocked any mention to an international court ruling against Beijing in their statement, diplomats said.

Foreign ministers from the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) met for the first time since the Permanent Court of Arbitration handed an emphatic legal victory to the Philippines in the dispute this month.

The ruling by the court in The Hague denied China's sweeping claims in the strategic seaway, through which more than $5 trillion in global trade passes each year.

China claims most of the sea, but ASEAN members the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei all have rival claims. Beijing says the ruling has no bearing on its rights in the sea, and described the case as a farce.

The Philippines and Vietnam both wanted the communique issued by ASEAN foreign ministers after their meeting to refer to the ruling and the need to respect international law, ASEAN diplomats said. Their foreign ministers both discussed the ruling with ASEAN counterparts in the Laotian capital.

But before the meeting, China's closest ASEAN ally Cambodia opposed the proposed wording, throwing the group into disarray. Phnom Penh supports Beijing's opposition to any ASEAN stand on the South China Sea, and its preference for dealing with the disputed claims on a bilateral basis.

FIRST DEADLOCK SINCE 2012

"We are still working on it," Indonesia's Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi told Reuters after the meeting on Sunday, adding that she hoped the ASEAN members would reach an agreement.

Cambodia's Foreign Minister Prak Sokhon declined to comment on his country's position on Sunday.

Even after a late-night meeting of foreign ministers called to thrash out the issue late on Saturday, the region's top diplomats were unable to find a compromise.

The group has given itself until Tuesday to come to issue a statement, said one ASEAN diplomat.

ASEAN is facing the prospect of being unable to issue a statement after a meeting for only the second time in its 49-year history. The first time, in 2012, was also due to Cambodia's resistance to language about the South China Sea.

"We have been here before and I hope they can solve it," said one official from the ASEAN Secretariat in Indonesia. "It is the same story again, a repeat of the meeting in 2012."

Over the next two days, Southeast Asian nations will meet with China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. Kerry and Wang are also expected to meet and discuss the maritime issues.

Wang, who started bilateral meetings with ASEAN members on Sunday, said he thought the media focus on the South China Sea issue was "very strange".

It was "not a China-ASEAN issue," he said, adding that disputes should be resolved among the parties involved.

Japan's Foreign Minister Fumiko Kishida will also be in Laos for the ASEAN regional forum meeting. It is unclear if he will meet Wang, but China reacted angrily to Kishida saying he would discuss the sea issue if they do meet.

China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang, in a statement posted on the ministry's website, said the sea is not Japan's concern.

"We urge Japan not to hype up and meddle in the South China Sea issue," he said. "Japan is not a concerned party in the South China Sea, and because of its disgraceful history is in no place to make irresponsible comments about China."

U.S. ROLE

The United States, allied with the Philippines and cultivating closer relations with Vietnam, has called on China to respect the court's ruling.

It has criticized China's building of artificial islands and facilities in the sea and has sailed warships close to the disputed territory to assert freedom of navigation rights.

But Kerry will urge ASEAN nations to explore diplomatic ways to ease tension over Asia's biggest potential military flashpoint, a senior U.S. official said ahead of his trip.

Chinese state media called for "damage control" at the meetings. A commentary published by the official Xinhua news agency on Sunday said the court ruling was a "blow to peace and stability in the region ... and only serves to increase the likelihood of confrontation and turbulence."

Barack Obama is set in September to become the first U.S. president to visit Laos, attending an annual summit hosted by the country that holds the ASEAN chairmanship.

Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi is also in Laos, making her debut at ASEAN meetings as the foreign minister for Myanmar.


Sumber - Reuters

Picking Sides: A World of Opinions on South China Sea Case

By Matthew Pennington

A case brought by U.S. ally the Philippines against China represents a diplomatic dilemma for far-flung nations as Washington and Beijing rally support for their respective positions on the use of international arbitration in South China Sea disputes.

The United States has been building diplomatic pressure in the West and in Asia on China to abide by the Hague-based tribunal's decision, which is expected soon. China, which maintains it won't be bound by the ruling, has been pushing back by building support from nations mostly in Africa and the Mideast.

The U.S. is not a party to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, under which the tribunal has been constituted, but says it wants China to play by international rules. Since there is no enforcement mechanism for the ruling, any impact will depend on how the international community reacts.

Here's a look at where dozens of countries stand:

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

ASEAN has been trying for years to achieve diplomatic solutions in the South China Sea, making little progress and exposing divisions in the 10-member bloc, which includes the Philippines. Reaching consensus on the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling will be tough.

When President Barack Obama met ASEAN leaders in February they agreed on "full respect for legal and diplomatic processes" in accordance with the U.N. convention, but pro-China members Cambodia and Laos nixed any mention of "arbitration."

Vietnam, which has fought China over competing South China Sea claims, has been most supportive of the Philippines' case and submitted a statement to the tribunal. Hanoi has said it supports "full compliance" to the procedures of the convention.

But other ASEAN nations are generally wary of speaking out for fear of alienating China, the region's economic heavyweight. Malaysia and Brunei have said little about the case, though they too are South China Sea claimants.

Indonesia and Singapore are not claimants but have been a bit more outspoken. Singapore's Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said last week that the ruling could have implications beyond the South China Sea and "we cannot subscribe to the principle that might is right." Indonesia's Foreign Ministry declined to say whether the ruling should be binding on both sides but said international law must be respected.

Even the Philippines' position is unpredictable as a new government takes office there June 30. President-elect Rodrigo Duterte has expressed willingness to restart bilateral negotiations with China.

RUSSIA

Moscow, which shares China's suspicion of Washington, is Beijing's most prominent supporter on the issue. On a visit to China in April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia is against any interference from outside parties in the South China Sea — a reference to the U.S. — "or any attempts to internationalize these disputes." Like China, Russia says disputes should be resolved through talks between the parties directly involved.

CHINA SUPPORTERS IN AFRICA, MIDEAST

China's state news agency Xinhua on May 20 said that more than 40 countries have expressed support for China's stance on the arbitration case. The Foreign Ministry has in recent weeks given prominent mention to support it claims to have from nations principally in Africa, the Mideast and Central Asia.

But few of those foreign governments have issued statements independently. Some, including Cambodia, Laos and Fiji, have disavowed China's description of their position.

Experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington said they could confirm official statements from Afghanistan, Gambia, Niger, Sudan and Vanuatu. A Chinese statement with the 21-member Arab League supported China but it was unclear if it represented all the parties' official positions.

EUROPEAN UNION and G-7

The EU has urged all South China Sea claimants to resolve disputes through peaceful means and "pursue them in accordance with international law," including the U.N. convention. The Group of Seven wealthy nations, which comprises Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.S. and the EU, has called on all states to fully implement decisions binding on them in courts and tribunals provided under the convention.

In June, French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian proposed that European navies coordinate patrols in Asian waters to reinforce a rules-based maritime order. He warned that if the laws of the sea are not respected in that region, they could also be challenged in the Arctic Ocean or Mediterranean Sea.

AUSTRALIA

In January, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said the China-Philippines ruling will be "extremely important" as a statement of international principle and will "settle once and for all" whether artificial reefs are entitled to territorial waters. But Australia has been less outspoken in support of arbitration than the U.S., perhaps mindful of Australia's own resistance to arbitration to resolve its disputed maritime border with tiny East Timor.

INDIA

India has not issued a categorical position on arbitration case, but has been broadly supportive of the application of international law. India shares U.S. concerns about Beijing's rising ambitions in the seas of Asia.

India's External Affairs Ministry says that "all countries must abide by international law and norms on maritime issues." India set an example in 2014 when it accepted a decision by the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration that ruled in favor of Bangladesh in a dispute over the countries' maritime boundary.

JAPAN

Japan was an early supporter of the Philippines' pursuit of arbitration and says both China and the Philippines should abide by the outcome. Japan sees that as upholding international law, but it also reflects concern that historic rival China seeks strategic control of vital sea lanes in the South China Sea that carry 80 percent of Japan's crude oil imports.

Japan's support of third-party dispute resolution is not universal. While it has sought to take its dispute with South Korea over the South Korean-held Dokdo or Takeshima islands to the International Court of Justice, it says no such action is needed in its dispute with China over the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands, which are administered by Japan.

SOUTH KOREA

 Like Japan, South Korea is heavily dependent on fuel imports that pass through the South China Sea, but it has closer ties with China and has been less inclined to speak out. The Foreign Ministry says South China Sea disputes should be resolved under internationally established regulations and that it is "looking with interest" at the Philippine-China arbitration case.

TAIWAN

Taiwan has complained that the tribunal has not solicited its views. While Taipei officially exercises the same nine-dash line claim as Beijing in the South China Sea, it is primarily concerned about Taiping island in the Spratlys. Taiwan administers that remote land feature and is concerned it could be designated as a rock without the rights granted to islands.


Sumber - ABC News

Japan Enters South China Sea Dispute

By Yoichi Funabashi

Boosting and training coast guards is a civilian-power solution to tensions in the East and South China Seas

In the coming months, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague is set to issue its judgment on the case brought by the Philippines that challenges China’s claims in the South China Sea. Beijing appears to be anticipating an unfavorable ruling and is reaffirming its stance on the illegitimacy of the UN tribunal.

Beijing has long argued that such disputes should be solved bilaterally and rejects international intervention. This non-multilateral strategy to negotiations works in China’s favor, leaving the claimants and other interested nations weak and divided on maritime security issues. But a united regional front is exactly what is needed to uphold the rules-based order and respond to China’s attempts to gradually change the status quo by coercive means.

Mindful of its own tensions with Beijing in the East China Sea, and of the importance of avoiding a split between Asia and the Pacific, Tokyo is now stepping forward to take the lead in strengthening policy coordination on maritime security. Japan is pioneering a civilian power approach that may offer an alternative to military solutions.

With financial backing from the Japan International Cooperation Agency, or JICA, the nation is trying to strengthen the region’s civilian law-enforcement apparatus. One major initiative is a new master’s program in “Maritime Safety and Security Policy,” jointly administered by the Japan Coast Guard, JCG, and the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.

The goal of the one-year course is to develop a network of future leaders, by offering an opportunity for junior coast guard officers from Asia to spend half a year studying in Tokyo and the other half at Japan’s coast guard academy in Hiroshima. Students currently enrolled in the program come from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Desperate for a non-military to disputes in the South China Sea, ASEAN countries are increasingly interested in the JCG role in maritime law enforcement.

The JCG is a civilian force under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism that is tasked with protecting Japan’s territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone – the sixth largest EEZ in the world at approximately 4.47 million square kilometers. Open and safe sea lanes are an existential challenge for Japan, a resource-poor island nation.

The JCG has a successful history of managing threats in the maritime sphere. For example in the 1990s and early 2000s, North Korea’s aggressive espionage operations in Japanese territorial waters were thwarted. Perhaps the most notable incident was in December 2001 when the JCG pursued what was later discovered to be a North Korean spy boat in the sea off south Japan. While fleeing, the North Korean boat attacked the JCG patrol boat with automatic machine guns and a rocket launcher, after which the JCG shot in self-defense. The spy boat soon sank of its own devices, and the rescued crewmembers were later brought to trial. The JCG’s ability to respond has allowed Japan to avoid resorting to military options in maintaining stability.

The JCG is highly trusted in Japan and has strong public support. The JCG even made its way into popular culture with Umizaru, or Sea Monkey, a manga series later adapted into a TV show and movie that follows the life a JCG officer on search-and-rescue missions.

However, over the past decade the JCG has faced unprecedented challenges to its ability to uphold the rule of law. Chinese vessels have increasingly entered into waters claimed by Japan and aggressively contested Japan’s territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Tensions have been somewhat diffused since escalations in 2010 when the JCG arrested a Chinese fishing trawler captain for ramming Japanese patrol boats, and in 2012 following the Japanese government’s purchase of the islands from its former private owner.

Despite the fact that China Coast Guard patrol boats now regularly enter the waters surrounding the Senkakus to assert their presence, a mechanism for stabilizing the situation has been built. Known as the 3-3-2 formula, three Chinese patrol boats enter the waters near the Senkakus three times a month for up to two hours each time, and leave after receiving a warning from the JCG.  This is by no means a resolution, but solving disputes is not the JCG’s goal. Its objective is to preserve the status quo through civilian law enforcement, and military options do not feature into the equation. It is a peace-building process that paves the way for diplomatic solutions to be explored.

The China Coast Guard’s massive CCG 2901 patrol vessel recently assigned to the East China Sea division has raised fears that the peace maintained by the coast guard is in jeopardy. The new vessel far surpasses JCG vessels and is equipped with military-type weapons, signaling China’s intentions to intimidate. The danger here is if Japan responds by calling upon its self-defense forces, JSDF, to intervene or by beefing up its own coast guard with larger boats and more powerful weapons.

A coast guard arms race could ensue that may see the coast guard transgress its civilian mandate. Indeed, the CCG 2901 is designed to test Japan’s resolve and exploit the gray areas of remit between the JCG and JSDF.

Similarly, China has launched another “monster” vessel, CCG 3901, which has set ASEAN nations on alert at the prospect of further militarization in the South China Sea. Regardless of such posturing, China has signaled that it does not want to engage in a military conflict over disputed islets and waters. Japan and ASEAN nations must therefore be careful not to react unwittingly to China’s provocations.

The Philippines vs China arbitration case ruling is set to become a defining moment for the future trajectory of China’s engagement with South China Sea claimant nations. One outcome is that Beijing will react by stepping-up its unilateral revisionist behavior as a bold statement of intent. On the other hand, victory for Rodrigo Duterte, president elect of the Philippines, has opened up the possibility of the country using a successful ruling as leverage at a bilateral negotiation table with China.

Current ritualization of interactions between the Japanese and Chinese coast guards in the East China Sea should be further entrenched. An alternative approach to maritime security has evolved – a tacit form of strategic ambiguity that doesn’t disturb the status quo and can steer both nations away from armed solutions towards diplomatic solutions. The success of this coast guard–maintained peace model has significant implications for the South China Sea and offers potential for replication.

In line with its shifting strategic identity towards proactive pacifism, Japan is expanding its military capacity-building assistance to ASEAN countries. But this is not enough, and carries risks of misunderstandings and miscalculations. Based on its own experiences in the East China Sea, Japan’s concept of capacity-building should be centered on rule making and law enforcement by civilian institutions. The JCG-led professional graduate program is one step in the right direction to constructing this new regional architecture.

A non-military approach can also open the path for greater policy coordination between ASEAN members that have struggled to form a shared position on how to respond to China’s great wall-of-sand construction.

As the scope of the JCG increases, Japan should become a forerunner in promoting a vision of a nation and region that pursues “global civilian power” in managing maritime security tensions.


Sumber - Asia Sentinel

Eliminating Statelessness in Southeast Asia

ASEAN can take some reasonable measures to address the plight.

By Michael Caster

The government of Myanmar has come under fire this month following Aung San Suu Kyi’s rebuke of U.S. Ambassador Scot Marciel’s reference to the Rohingya, the estimated one million stateless Muslim inhabitants of Myanmar’s Western Rakhine State. Aung San Suu Kyi’s government refuses to fully confront the issue of the Rohingya, who have been denied equal access to citizenship since the passage of the 1982 Citizenship Law. The denial of citizenship has compounded human rights abuses, rising to the crime of genocide, according to an October study by Fortify Rights. The persecution of the Rohingya has deservedly captured increasing international attention in recent years, although greater awareness and mobilization is needed. The plight of statelessness remains a universal challenge.

Around the world, there are an estimated 15 million stateless people. According to the UNHCR, somewhere a stateless child is born every 10 minutes and within the countries hosting the 20 largest stateless populations some 70,000 stateless children are born every year. In 2014, the UNHCR announced its Campaign to end Statelessness in ten years. The same year, the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion reported that more people in Asia and the Pacific are affected by statelessness than in any other region of the world. How ASEAN addresses this challenge will be key to achieving the UN’s objective of eradicating statelessness by 2024.

The Right to Have Rights

Hannah Arendt, in The Origins of Totalitarianism, calls citizenship the right to have rights, a sentiment which entered jurisprudence in 1958 through U.S. Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren, who wrote that the denial of citizenship is the denial of all claims to protection from any nation.

Modern notions of nationality emerged following World War I through a series of League of Nations treaties, which granted States total freedom to determine how individuals obtained or lost nationality. Such absolutism of State sovereignty changed following World War II with the realization of the degree of harm caused by discriminatory nationality laws, such as the Nuremburg Laws. This realization gave rise to Article 15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, granting everyone the right to nationality.

Also in 1948, the United Nations commissioned the Study on Statelessness, released a year later. The Study affirmed that eradicating statelessness requires that, “Every child must receive a nationality at birth” and “No person throughout his life should lose his nationality until he has acquired a new one.”

The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, adopted in 1954, provides the legal definition of statelessness as “a person who is not considered a national by any state under the operation of its law.” The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness followed with more guidance. However, both Conventions remain poorly ratified with only 86 and 65 state parties respectively. The Philippines is the only ASEAN country to have ratified the 1954 Convention.

The right to nationality was further codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). However, Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Singapore are not State parties. On the other hand, all ASEAN member states are parties to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Together they prohibit gender discrimination in matters of nationality, require immediate birth registration, and place an obligation on states to respect the right of the child to preserve identity and nationality.

Statelessness in ASEAN

The 2009 ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human rights (AICHR) and 2010 ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) are both mandated with developing strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights. ACWC is furthermore empowered “to advocate on behalf of women and children, especially the most vulnerable and marginalized, and encourage ASEAN member states to improve their situation” and “to propose and promote appropriate measures…for the prevention and elimination of all forms of violation of the rights of women and children.”

Stateless people are indisputably among the most vulnerable and marginalized and international norms make explicit reference to women and children’s equal right to nationality. As such, AICHR and ACWC appear to have a mandated obligation to play a leading role in the elimination of statelessness in ASEAN, especially in ensuring birth registration and the elimination of gender discrimination in nationality laws.

One of the challenges to a regional approach is the lack of a unified definition of statelessness in domestic laws. The 1954 Convention provides the legal definition but the failure to ratify or implement in domestic laws provides countries with maneuverability. The Philippines offers the best example, having enacted the Convention and definition into domestic law in 2012. Vietnam and Laos provide a definition for stateless persons but do not go as far as the Philippines in implementing protections. The refusal to implement the accepted international definition in Myanmar, for example, has contributed to the State narrative that Rohingya do not qualify for protection as stateless because they are migrants from Bangladesh.

Birth registration, a human right vital for protecting against stateless, is not equally guaranteed throughout ASEAN. Cambodia provides a best practice in birth registration campaigning. In 2000, only around 5 percent of Cambodian births were registered. The Ministry of Interior, with support from UNICEF and others, initiated a pilot program involving more than 13,000 people who had received specialized training in birth registration. Within the first ten months of the program over 7 million adults and children were registered. Subsequently birth certificates were issued free of charge within 30 days of birth and only a small fee was incurred for late registration.

However, the 1996 Nationality Law offers no definition for statelessness and ambiguity in language implies that Khmer ethnicity may be a prerequisite for citizenship. Despite birth registration campaigning, several thousand stateless people remain in Cambodia.

Prohibitive costs for birth registration, requirements for documents that are sometimes unavailable or nonexistent, and associated costs of transportation or hospital fees, contribute to statelessness as well. Such obstacles often remain even after well-meaning policies have been adopted.

In Thailand, the 2005 National Strategy on Administration of Legal Status and Rights of Persons and 2008 changes in the Nationality Law ostensibly provided undocumented and migrant children, including stateless children, the right to attend primary and elementary school. Unfortunately, transportation or uniform costs continue to make education prohibitively expensive. Similarly, according to Children of the Forest, a child protection organization that works with stateless children and trafficking victims at the Thai-Myanmar border, among the common ways that children there become stateless is that parents will leave the hospital before registration because they couldn’t afford hospital services. Failure to register at the time of birth significantly increases the burden of registration at a later date. In 2015, the Thai government reported that over 18,000 previously stateless people had been given Thai nationality over the preceding three years. However, concerns over remaining obstacles in Thailand and elsewhere remain.

Gender discrimination in nationality laws is a significant contributor to statelessness. In Malaysia, although men and women confer nationality equally, children of Malaysian mothers born abroad only obtain citizenship at the discretion of the Malaysian Government. Mothers in Brunei have no right to pass nationality to their children. In a positive move, Singapore, in 2004, and Indonesia, in 2006, amended their nationality laws to permit mothers to pass citizenship to their children.

Three Approaches for the Elimination of Statelessness

The UNHCR acknowledges that some of the safeguards within the 1961 Convention have been enacted by ASEAN Member States. Still, accession to the two Conventions would provide the clearest framework for adapting national laws and policies to identifying, protecting, and eradicating statelessness within ASEAN. Although this is unlikely any time soon, there are three arguably more achievable measures that would strengthen the efforts to eradicate statelessness: empowering regional human rights bodies; emphasizing birth registration; and eliminating gender discriminatory nationality laws.

ASEAN created and empowered the AICHR and ACWC with a relatively robust mandate but they suffer from the lack of independence and weak enforcement capabilities. ASEAN’s Commitment to human rights, as expressed through the 2004 Vientiane Action Program and subsequent treaties, calls for strengthening such mechanisms.

This includes encouraging and working with States to withdraw reservations and amend laws that violate the right to nationality and birth registration, and localizing the legal definition of statelessness.

While civil society organizations are sometimes invited to regional consultations, the AICHR and ACWC remain under government authority. State representatives are largely coordinated by respective ministries of foreign affairs and not by national human rights institutions. Of course, national human rights institutions are not necessarily independent, as demonstrated in Myanmar and Thailand. However, AICHR and ACWC representatives from Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines have attempted to work around certain political obstacles by involving civil society and individual human rights defenders in the drafting or evaluation process, at times, and should be encouraged to do more so in terms of nationality issues.

Empowering regional human rights bodies to take a more active role in the identification and elimination of statelessness may also require the improvement of complaints mechanisms. Specifically, regional human rights bodies with a mandate over CEDAW and CRC should have specialized training and procedures for hearing complaints of arbitrary denaturalization, denial of nationality at birth or obstacles to birth registration.

The establishment of a regional human rights court would provide another forum for investigating and prosecuting the widespread or systematic arbitrary denial of nationality or grave human rights violations arising from the denial of nationality.

Registration at birth is of paramount importance. The ACWC mandate implies a role for the organization in birth registration campaigning and, in cooperation with child protection and gender experts, it should arguably take a more active role in harmonizing birth registration laws and advising campaigns throughout the region.

Drawing from Cambodia, efforts at raising awareness through television and radio should be maintained while other channels should be investigated and utilized. Public education during popular holidays would likely reach larger audiences. Because of challenges of birth registration campaigns reaching hill tribes or remote regions of Thailand, for example, efforts should be made to identify new strategies for locations or times of greatest community congregation. Registration campaigners should also concentrate around markets, where women may be likely to congregate. Campaigning should be increased around holidays when people from more remote areas are most likely to be present or when weather is more amenable to travel.

In order to address financial and administrative obstacles, a regional funding mechanism could be piloted to offset the costs of birth registration, including associated transportation costs. A period should be designated when birth registration is free, and after that waivers should be made available for the extremely poor.

There is also a role for innovative technology. Digital birth registration programs point to innovation in improving registration and archiving records.

A robust regional investigation into gender-based discrimination in nationality laws is a fundamental component of addressing statelessness. A widespread gender-based assessment of equal access to nationality should be conducted throughout ASEAN. Member states, especially Singapore and Indonesia, should work with Malaysia and Brunei to amend their Nationality Laws to abolish gender discrimination. Based on their mandates, this presents a strong opening for AICHR and ACWC involvement.

Admittedly there remain serious social and political obstacles to eradicating statelessness. Such obstacles have been reproduced through decades of structural violence and historical narratives of exclusion. The involvement of United Nations experts or foreign governments is not always greeted with fanfare. But ASEAN has made specific commitments and empowered regional bodies with a mandate to promote and protect human rights. Identifying and eradicating statelessness in ASEAN cannot be seen as a foreign imposition, as the government of Myanmar claims, but as an obligation inherent in the ASEAN Charter and within the mandate of regional bodies for the full realization of human rights for all.


Sumber - The Diplomat

18,000 dalam pekerjaan tidak formal di Brunei

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, 20 Mei – Bilangan orang yang bekerja dalam pekerjaan tidak formal di Brunei Darussalam dianggarkan 18,000 dan usaha memformalkan mereka yang bekerja dalam pekerjaan tidak formal di negara ini adalah digalakkan menerusi meluaskan rangkaian keselamatan sosial, usaha memulakan perniagaan, peningkatan perkhidmatan kerajaan dan mengukuhkan perkongsian swasta dan awam.

Ini dinyatakan oleh Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Yang Berhormat Pehin Orang Kaya Seri Kerna Dato Seri Setia (Dr.) Haji Awang Abu Bakar bin Haji Apong pada Sesi ke-24 Mesyuarat Menteri-menteri Buruh ASEAN dan Mesyuarat Campur Tiga Menteri-menteri Buruh ASEAN ke-9 di Vientiane, Laos baru-baru ini.

Pada mesyuarat itu, para Menteri ASEAN yang menyelia buruh dan pekerjaan telah mengkaji semula dan bersetuju untuk meningkatkan kegiatan pada masa hadapan untuk melanjutkan lagi kerjasama teknikal buruh antara negara-negara anggota ASEAN.

Para Menteri Buruh ASEAN telah menyokong beberapa rancangan kerja bekerjasama dilaksanakan antara tahun 2016 dan 2020 bagi Jawatankuasa ASEAN Pelaksanaan Deklarasi Perlindungan dan Penggalakan Hak-hak Pekerja Penghijrah (ACMW) ASEAN, dan Kumpulan Kerja SLOM berhubung Amalan Progresif Buruh untuk meningkatkan persaingan ASEAN (SLOM-WG).

Inisiatif program kerja baru menyeluruh juga dibentuk bagi Menteri-menteri Buruh ASEAN dengan matlamat merealisasikan Komuniti Bersepadu ASEAN menjelang 2025.

Yang Berhormat Pehin bergambar ramai bersama delegasi Brunei yang menghadiri mesyuarat berkenaan di Vientiene, Laos

Pada mesyuarat yang bermula pada 15 Mei itu, para menteri bersetuju untuk menyokong “Deklarasi Vientiane bagi Peralihan daripada Pekerjaan Tidak Formal kepada Pekerjaan Formal ke arah Galakan Pekerjaan Yang Memuaskan di ASEAN.”

Deklarasi Vientiane dijangka dikemukakan kepada Sidang Mesyuarat ASEAN ke-28 di Kerajaan Republik Demokratik Rakyat Laos pada bulan September 2016 bagi pembentukannya.

Menteri Buruh dan Kebajikan Sosial Kerajaan Republik Demokratik Rakyat Lao, Dr Khamphaeng Xaysomphaeng yang mempengerusikan mesyuarat itu, melahirkan penghargaannya di atas sokongan yang diberikan oleh rakan sejawatan beliau dari ASEAN sementara juga menekankan pentingnya mesyuarat itu dalam mengkaji semula kemajuan kerjasama buruh antara negara-negara anggota ASEAN.

Menteri Buruh ASEAN juga membincangkan kemajuan yang dicapai dan juga cabaran yang masih dipertimbangkan, draf instrumen ASEAN bagi perlindungan dan penggalakan hak-hak pekerja penghijrah.

Pada mesyuarat itu para menteri bersetuju bahawa had akhir baru bagi memuktamadkan instrumen draf ialah April 2017.

Juga hadir pada mesyuarat itu ialah menteri-menteri dan timbalan-timbalan menteri dari Republik Rakyat China, Jepun dan Republik Korea.

Delegasi Brunei termasuklah Setiausaha Tetap di Kementerian Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Haji Mohd ‘Abdoh bin Dato Seri Setia Haji Abdul Salam; Duta Brunei Darussalam ke Republik Demokratik Rakyat Laos, Tuan Yang Terutama Haji Na’aim bin Mohd Salleh; Pemangku Pesuruhjaya Buruh, Haji Rani bin Begawan Pehin Siraja Khatib Dato Seri Setia Haji Mohd Yusof dan juga para pegawai kanan dari Kementerian Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri dan Jabatan Buruh.


Sumber - Media Permata

Nations form pact in fight against terrorism at sea

Taking them on: Teams from the special forces of Brunei, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand
taking part in a military exercise during the ADMM in Bandar Seri Begawan.

Singapore: The Singapore leg of a multinational military exercise kicked off as task forces intercepted and stormed a merchant vessel hijacked by “terrorists” at sea.

The action-packed operation was part of the Asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus Maritime Security and Counter-Terrorism Exercise in Brunei. It will now continue in Singapore until Thursday.

The 11-day drill, which involves realistic sea- and land-based scenarios, aims to strengthen the capabilities of participating nations in tackling terrorism and maritime threats.

About 3,500 personnel, 18 naval vessels, 25 aircraft and 40 special forces teams from 18 countries are taking part. Participants include the 10 Asean nations, the United States, Australia, China, Japan, India, South Korea, New Zealand and Russia.

The inaugural ADMM-Plus convened in Vietnam in 2010, with the goal of boosting security and defence cooperation among Asean countries and their partners.

Working groups were set up in various areas of cooperation, which include maritime security and counter-terrorism.

This is the fifth ADMM-Plus field training exercise. The first was held in 2013 and focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and military medicine.

This is the first time that the ADMM-Plus’ maritime security and counter-terrorism working groups are collaborating in an exercise.

Its joint operations director Brigadier-General (BG) Desmond Tan, 45, said such a collaboration is important as terrorism can occur out at sea.

“This has the added advantage of (adding) more relevance and realism to the exercise, (as) terrorism and maritime security are sometimes intertwined,” said BG Tan.

He added that collaboration allows for a wider scope of interaction among the troops. Citing piracy issues, BG Tan also described the exercise as timely and relevant.

“I think we all recognise that these are trans-boundary challenges that no one country can tackle by itself,” he said.

In yesterday’s drill, the maritime security task force headquarters in Brunei’s Muara Naval Base and the counter-terrorism task force headquarters in Changi Naval Base were alerted to a hijacked vessel.

After tracking down the vessel, the hijackers were eventually subdued and the hostages rescued.


Sumber - The Star Online

Brunei silenced on South China Sea claims

China offers joint deep-sea drilling as oil revenues sink

Brunei is an absolute monarchist, Islamic state of 420,000 people on the north coast of Borneo, wedged into the Malaysian state of Sarawak. Indonesia and Malaysia own 99 percent of Borneo, which is the third largest island in the world, located at the maritime center of Southeast Asia. It has become a key pawn in China’s offense to control the South China Sea.

The United Nations Permanent Arbitration Court in The Hague is due to rule on the Philippines’ claim to the Scarborough Shoal – expected end-May or June. China is scrambling to find global and regional support for “direct bilateral negotiations” rather than international arbitration. It refuses to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court and says it will not abide by its rulings.

China is particularly keen to disable ASEAN from uniting against its ‘nine-dash line’ claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea. It has declared that Laos and Cambodia agree disputes should be settled through direct bilateral negotiations. It has now added Brunei to that list, removing three of the 10 members of ASEAN, which works only through group consensus.

‘Resource Curse’ grips Brunei

Over three decades since its independence from Britain in 1984, the kingdom flew on the magic carpet of oil and gas exports. Earnings from this natural resource enabled its society to be tax-free and well-provided with employment, public health, subsidized housing and free education. Its 29th Sultan, Hassanal Bolkiah, is one of the world’s richest men, with personal net worth estimated at US$20-27 billion.

The oil price is now off 70 percent from its 2008 peak. Like all countries overly dependent on commodity exports, Brunei suddenly finds itself hostage to a global pricing slump. As 90 percent of government finances come from oil and gas, that has unhinged the entire economy. Plans to diversify from oil dependency are drafted in an ambitious grand plan called Vision Brunei 2035. Almost 80 percent of citizens are employed directly by the government or its statutory corporations.

Brunei’s ground oil reserves are estimated to run out in two decades as well. Deep-sea drilling and exploration for oil and gas, is prohibitively expensive. China has reached out to jointly explore deep-sea opportunities for production sharing. Brunei has accepted the deal and made its peace on overlapping sea claims.

Aside from The Philippines, the other littoral ASEAN states with Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) cutting across China’s nine-dash line are Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles off the coasts of maritime countries.

Establishing facts & dishing cash

China’s nine-dash line claim is recognized by no international body. It converts its claim into practical reality through forward deployment and occupation of islands in dispute. It is doing so at speed.

ASEAN states’ EEZs will remain unexploited, without the cash to invest in deep-sea drilling tests, and technology to extract reserves. China has the financial capacity to fund deep-sea exploration and the strategic need for hydrocarbon energy. It is using the cash bait to co-opt littoral ASEAN states into its South China Sea co-prosperity scheme. It also has infrastructure goodies on offer in its ‘Belt and Road’ master plan.

Block passage, checkmate Taiwan

Brunei is an important pawn neutralized on the chessboard, to stymie any ASEAN pushback. The parallel strategic benefit for China in the South China Sea, would be military control over these waters, to choke timely arrival of US Forces to defend Taiwan or Japan – both of whom have defence pacts with the USA.

China calculates that the US would rather avoid confrontation with an assertive power with military assets in place. Its South China Sea militarization is rapidly reaching critical mass. The US has shown no firm resolve to challenge that. The ASEAN nations have no capacity to stop China’s navy, or its rampaging fishing fleets.

The reunification of Taiwan is a highly charged national dream which President Xi Jinping has stoked. He already enjoys huge popularity with the masses – although not in Taiwan – for his sustained anti-graft campaign, which has snagged ‘tigers and flies’ at all levels of the government and party – sweeping away factions and personalities opposed to his unprecedented consolidation of personal power.

He has seven more years left of his two-term limit. If Taiwan is reunited with the mainland under his watch, Xi would be elevated to the level of Mao and Deng, on the altar of historic CCP heroes. Neither of these CCP strongmen could lock-up Taiwan. The last ruler who unified China was Emperor Qin Shi Huang in 221 BC.

Control over the South China Sea would bring that glorious day closer. US aircraft carriers just need to be delayed long enough for the PRC to reintegrate Taiwan. Political formulae for a high degree of autonomy and a separate local legislature, are well discussed exchanges in the long-running cross-straits talks.

After all, the US has accepted One-China sovereignty. It would be checkmate and game for China, without a shot being fired. Isn’t that what war strategy is all about – winning without a fight?


Sumber - Asia Sentinel

Why ASEAN Must Remain Neutral on the South China Sea

Pressure is growing for the bloc to condemn China. It should resist.

By Scott Edwards

Pressure is growing on ASEAN to choose condemnation of China and both explicit and implicit support of the U.S. in the South China Sea. Proponents argue that this is a way to shift the tide and contain an expanding Chinese presence. And it has come at a time when ASEAN has demonstrated concern over the fast rising tensions in the area and increasing militarization, demonstrated by comments made at the most recent foreign ministers’ retreat. Formerly “neutral” states such as Indonesia are also signaling increased concern at the tensions and focusing on China’s role.

Clearly, ASEAN should play a significant future role in the South China Sea. If the current pressures find success, however, they could have a host of negative effects on both ASEAN’s internal coherency and its ability to play a meaningful role. Instead, ASEAN should continue to focus on its (limited) past success in trust and confidence building, both internally and externally. Trust is important in the region, and this would present an alternative future path for developments in the South China Sea by allowing ASEAN to have conflict-free engagement with China. Just as importantly, it would prevent ASEAN from allowing disagreements to upset intra-regional stability, with the potential to undo the bloc’s significant attempts to foster trust among its member states.

Attempts by the United States to engage with ASEAN as a regional bloc, one diplomatic culmination of the US “rebalance” to Asia, are often seen as pressuring ASEAN to take a stronger line in the South China Sea. The February Sunnylands summit, the first held between the leaders of the U.S. and ASEAN in the United States, was representative. Whilst Sunnylands boasted a mixed agenda including areas such as trade and counter-terrorism, observers were quick to demonstrate that the focus would be on the South China Sea, following comments made in the invitation. Despite U.S. President Barack Obama calling for ASEAN to present a united stance on the South China Sea issue, as well as hopes that the summit would result in increased cooperation, the outcome was limited to a vague declaration on shared commitments. Significantly, this declaration avoided explicitly drawing attention to China’s role in the emerging issues and tensions, and the summit was considered a failure. Sunnylands is not the first time such divisions have prevented a unified outlook towards the South China Sea; in 2012, for instance, ASEAN could not agree on a joint statement, the first time in 45 years this had happened.

The lack of willingness is seen outside of the region as reflecting a lack of strength or else a desire to appease China. Divisions are cited as a weakness of ASEAN and its policy of consensus which allows the member states to block a united front. These divisions are usually most marked between Vietnam and Philippines on the one hand, which have greater concerns about China, and members such as Cambodia, which has demonstrated a desire to avoid aggravating China. Cambodia has increasing military ties and rising Chinese aid and investment, making such a stance understandable. However, the divisions are not as black and white as made out. There are tangible reasons for ASEAN to maintain its united front – many don’t see China as simply a threat.  This is a fact recognized by officials from the countries within ASEAN, including both claimant states such as the Philippines and those that remain neutral such as Indonesia (though Indonesian neutrality may be waning). They argue that the South China Sea marks only one aspect of their extremely complex relations with China.

These perceptions may be changing slowly, seemingly further polarizing divides and pushing many of ASEAN’s members to take a harder line against China – desirable on the surface, but also problematic.

The Importance of Consensus

It should be understood that forcing ASEAN to choose sides may actually have dire consequences for the region, especially if states continue to have different (and complex) perceptions of China. Consensus has allowed a degree of trust and confidence to form among ASEAN member states, and this trust is important in an ASEAN with an expanding agenda, as states need to be assured that their interests will not be harmed in the myriad of sectors in which ASEAN wants to get involved. By maintaining consensus ASEAN member states are assured that their interests will be protected, and this has not only allowed an expanding agenda and increasing cooperation in the region, it has also been integral to the lack of conflict within ASEAN.

If ASEAN as a whole chooses to ignore the rationale behind the divisions and push forward with confronting China it may instead create strong distrust internally, as states could not be sure that their interests are secure. This could have disastrous effects on ASEAN as a whole if it creates fissures in other areas of ASEAN cooperation. ASEAN, and the West, should recognize the regional institution has a massive agenda that is not only limited to the South China Sea, and ask whether forcing a focus on this issue is worth the potential costs.

ASEAN choosing sides also undermines any future possibility of mediating tensions. ASEAN has made some progress in the past in attempting engagement with China through confidence building measures. The pinnacle of this was seen to be the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Building upon the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, the 2002 Declaration included China and declared a commitment to dialogue, trust-building, and peaceful means of dispute resolution. China, too, was the first external country to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003 which laid out the rules of behavior within ASEAN.

By inviting China into following the same set of rules in the region emphasizing peaceful resolution and dialogue it was hoped confidence could be built and cooperation increased through the evasion of escalation in the South China Sea. While it is clear at this stage that China is ignoring these agreements, if ASEAN were to choose sides it would prevent ASEAN from acting as a mediator in future, and means that militarization would be one of the only options remaining.

ASEAN’s Neutrality

Only by a measured response can ASEAN continue attempts at confidence building. While the chairman’s statement “reaffirmed the need to enhance mutual trust and confidence, exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities and avoid actions that may further complicate the situation, and pursue peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law,” it is unclear whether ASEAN can undertake such a task if its member states are increasingly divided or if it overtly chooses sides.

By maintaining a degree of impartiality multilaterally, ASEAN can continue to engage in confidence building measures and maintain trust within ASEAN. This does not preclude a harder line against China by the constituent member states, but that should continue to take place bilaterally. Trust is important, and maintaining it through consensus should be prioritized.


Sumber - The Diplomat

Talking Policy: YB Pehin Dato Lim Jock Seng on Brunei

Brunei, a Southeast Asian nation with a population of only 400,000, ranks among the world’s wealthiest nations per capita due to its extensive oil and gas resources. Situated strategically on the South China Sea and a member both of APEC and ASEAN, it is also a central player in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact now awaiting Congressional action. David A. Andelman, editor emeritus of World Policy Journal, sat down with Yang Berhormat Pehin Dato Lim Jock Seng, Brunei’s Second Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade and a close advisor to the His Majesty the Sultan of Brunei, to examine the stakes on both sides of the Pacific and to discuss the country’s domestic politics and relations with its neighbors.

DAVID A. ANDELMAN: Here we are in 2016 in very difficult times. Where do you see Brunei? What do you think is its place in the region right now?

YB PEHIN DATO LIM JOCK SENG: Brunei is a small country, with a population of about 400,000. We are the smallest member of ASEAN. And our role will be actually very minimal in any organization, being that size. So this is why ASEAN is so important to us, because this is one organization where we feel we can contribute to ASEAN, to the region, and internationally. If we're doing it alone, it would be impossible. Nobody cares.

DA: You're the wealthiest country in the region, along with Singapore, by far. You have great resources. You have a strong central government. You're a peaceful country. You should be one of the great forces in the region. Do you have that confidence to do that?

PDLJS: Yes, we are blessed with oil and gas, and when the prices fall and gas is high, we were able over the last 10-15 years to put all that extra money into reserve, and invest it to the States, Europe, and everywhere. So from these reserves, we have the financial backing, but some of the major players in the region are China, Japan, and India. Within ASEAN, we try to play our part. We feel that in diplomacy, the best way to do anything is to trust each other. I realized from my 30-plus years of experience that if you don't have the trust, however brilliant you are, you will never get anything done. We have friends, and the natural way for us in Brunei really is that we are very friendly—we like to be friends and trust is the main thing.

DA: Who do you think does not trust you in the region?

PDLJS: I think, generally, they see us as a small country of no significance, but they like us because we never trouble them, we never criticize them, and we are one of those who think, "fine, if that's alright with you, we'll come along."

DA: Does that include China?

PDLJS: That includes China. Both China and America are two major powers and we are friends with both. We tell our American friends that we're friendly with China, we're friendly with you, but it would be good if you could use us as a channel, because what I do is, every time I would see the Chinese, I would tell them, "have you ever thought properly what it is that the Americans really want? I would tell you exactly what it is." And then I will convey to them what the Chinese think, because the Chinese, when we talk about the South China Sea, were telling me, "look, here is China. We are surrounded by Korea, Japan ... and then you have Australia, you have Thailand, you have everybody around here. All have military relations with the United States. And the moment that Australia and New Zealand come in, we feel surrounded." So that's basically how we see our role.

DA: The Trans-Pacific Partnership is something that's of great interest now in America, and I'm sure here. Do you see TPP—since TPP has excluded China—as yet another threat to China? And since you are participating in that, do you see that you effectively are, too?

PDLJS: No, because TPP is an open association. Everybody can come in. And we've told the Chinese, "come." We've invited everybody and now they have some who are seriously thinking of coming in. And, I think the TPP is good in a sense that it is now moving the RCEP [Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership] we are doing with the Chinese and the Indians. That's 18 of us in total, without the United States. And now the pace is getting faster because they realize TPP is now on. And we told the Chinese we supported them, we want them to come in, the U.S. wants them to come in. I think the Chinese are thinking seriously now about it—they are getting interested in coming, and they're not as opposed to it.

DA: But aren't you afraid that the American government—depending on what administration we have after November—and Congress might say, "Oh, this is just another Trojan horse to get China more weight in the region?"

PDLJS: I think we have more confidence than you on this. In our last meeting, Obama was telling us that he feels that we'll be able to pull it off. And we were talking to Alex Feldman, with the ASEAN U.S. Business Council. Now, if you look at TPP and what they're doing, it would be silly of us not to proceed with it. And I'm sure there have been a lot of business sectors saying, “forget about politics.”

DA: What if the United States Congress said we're not going to ratify this now? Would you go ahead with it without the United States?

PDLJS: I'm not sure of that. We have to change some of the legislation, labor and all that, to accommodate, which will take about 18 months. Then we're ready to ratify.

DA: Do you sense that the aggressive role of China, in the South China Sea particularly, as well as its defensiveness against the TPP, would shift the power balance in this part of the world?

PDLJS: Economically, with the facts and figures, China is becoming a very important player. It is already the second largest economy in the world. Will it take over? It may, it may not. But at the same time, the U.S.—there is no country in the world that I've seen with the same amount of talent, research, and innovation. I was in California’s Silicon Valley. It’s fantastic! There I see Syrians, Sri Lankans, Vietnamese—all the best brains you have. There is nowhere else in the world like it, and that's why your American spirit, your American dream is important—although the Chinese are trying to get the Chinese dream. But, as long as you pursue this, I don't think anybody really has the environment to encourage that kind of innovation, and that's something that America has done very well.

DA: Can Brunei maintain its voice in the region with these levels of oil prices, or do you need to have a higher price of oil?

PDLJS: I think we need some sense so that both the consumer and the producer gain from it. There's no point in us getting $140 and have some people suffering somewhere. So what we need to get rid of is the volatility. I think Brunei's role and influence comes from having resources. And, in that sense, a fairly stable middle of the price of oil in the $60s to $70s range [would be good]. We're fine because constant production is very low.

DA: Now, what I find interesting is the lessons that Brunei could teach other smaller countries that have resources. Indonesia, for instance, has resources. Malaysia has resources. You have the fourth highest GDP-PPP in the world. You must be able to teach other countries something. What kinds of lessons can you teach them?

PDLJS: I’m going to explain to you the policy His Majesty has been following. I once told him, "We have spent a lot of money on welfare. We have spent a lot of money on education." His emphasis is: "I want education. I don't care what you all do, ministers. I want everyone to be educated from A to Z. I want everyone to have access to medical care. If you can't get it in Brunei, we'll fly the patients out. I want everybody to have housing—cheap housing, or free housing. In fact, in the end, it's all free housing." So I said, "You can't sustain it!" He said, "All the money that comes from oil and gas and everything to the government—it's for the people. So spend it on the people."

DA: I hope you won't take this the wrong way, but His Majesty lives very well. And his family lives very well. Do people resent this at all?

PDLJS: As far as I can gather, because he's trying to give all that money to the people, education and all that, people are quite comfortable. And then the social safety net—when you retire, when you're older, you still have the pension scheme, which is non-contributory, so you get it anyway. In that case, I think he has won half of the battle in the sense that he has given them the basics plus this social safety net.

DA: I knew Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew a bit. He was a tough man, very smart and very for the people. Did you ever contemplate how Brunei might have been different if you have followed more of a Lee Kwan Yew model? You had resources that they never had in terms of oil and so on, and natural gas.

PDLJS: I think with the kind of society we have, it would be difficult. Brunei's society is completely different from that of Singapore.

DA: How would you describe Brunei society in that respect?

PDLJS: I would say we are still family-oriented. Because of our small size, we all know each other, we're all related to each other. And this is why when you talk about corruption and all that, it is so difficult. I'll give you an example. I did my research in a fishing village for a year, and stayed with a family there. So when I came up, the family would say, "Look, my son hasn't got a job. Can you please help me?" And the expectation is that you must help him. Now half of me says no, half of me says you have to help him. So I'm caught in a dilemma between the Western and the Eastern world. Eventually, I said, "Send the application. If he's qualified, he'll get it."

DA: That's more of the Singapore model, isn't it? That's what we would say. I think one of the things you do share with Singapore is no corruption here, right?

PDLJS: We're trying to reduce it. We're conscious that we haven't succeeded.

DA: I don't think of Brunei as a corrupt society, certainly nothing like a lot of the Middle Eastern countries, or certainly most of the African nations. You're very high on the transparency international list, so that's good.

PDLJS: So we're hoping the TPP will help us because the TPP addresses the question of transparency. We need to make some of the rules very clear. That's one way of ruling out corruption. So in this sense, TPP is helping us to really move up.

DA: What would you say if the U.S. Congress rejected it? What would the consequences be for Brunei, and for the region?

PDLJS: Well, TPP is something that will provide us with a market of 800 million people. It provides us with capacity building—we are trying to build all our businesspeople, our rules, our regulations, so that it's on par with everyone. In this way, we are bringing Brunei into the international forum. So that's one aspect of it, apart from creating more jobs. But we also have many other free trade agreements with nations like Australia and New Zealand. There is also RCEP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Now this one is with India, China—but not the U.S. If TPP fails, some of these countries will come in.

DA: So basically, it'll be worse for America if it fails than it'll be for Brunei and the region.

PDLJS: Yes.

DA: That's a very interesting perspective.

PDLJS: But if you see the World Bank's report, we are number three getting benefits out of it. But we wouldn't get any benefits until we move up.

DA: Move up what?

PDLJS: In the sense of some of the rules, the regulations. If I want to attract American investors, my rules and my judiciary must be very clear. Some of the rules are not very clear, like labor. That's in the process of being done.

DA: But you don't need TPP for that. You realize that, right?

PDLJS: No, but TPP provides us this motivation.

DA: That's very interesting. So what else would you want from America?

PDLJS: I think, as I said, America is a very good friend of ours. One of the major powers, if not the major power. It has contributed a lot to the peace and stability of this region. China of course is the up-and-coming one, but we want them to play a positive role—the both of them.

DA: They seem to want to encroach on your oil lands and your oil fields in the South China Sea, and it seems they want to make life difficult for you.

PDLJS: At the end of the day, I think that China and the U.S. cannot afford to fight. The reality is that we need each other, and you can't do that. I don't think for a moment that the Chinese would be mad enough to do some thing, and I'm sure the Chinese have a long-term view of things.

DA: So you're not concerned then about these things that are happening in the South China Sea?

PDLJS: If it is the nine-dash line, it is part of it, but we're saying this is ours, and this is yours - but it's not going to come to any blows.

DA: I’m also interested in the legislative part of the government, and wanted to see how that worked in Brunei.

PDLJS: The composition of the legislative council, which was introduced in 2004, is that a quarter of those people are actually elected as head men of villages. From these 50-60 head men, 15 out of them get to represent in parliament. They were chosen by the people, through elections. And then His Majesty adds about five people who represent some ethnic communities and groups, and another five people who represent the interests from the private sector, people with contributions.

DA: So the idea as I understand it is that the legislative council—people come in, and tell the problems they have to the ministers. You're one of the ministers—you'll be up there?

PDLJS: Yes.

DA: If something does not go their way, they can't protest. There isn't that avenue. So does it still function as a safety valve in the communities, or does it not act as a source of frustration?

PDLJS: Our parliament is designed slightly differently. The parliament is trying to have the concept of a discussion, and trying to get a consensus; there is no such thing as opposition. And if you see the design of the sitting arrangement, it's different.

DA: Have they ever gotten what they wanted?

PDLJS: Some of them do, some don't, but some questions come up again and again. So the idea is, how do you find a consensus?

DA: But is it really a consensus? It's really not a true democracy, with all due respect. The head of state and head of government has been in power for over 40 years. But do people still feel a participation in the Brunei miracle, if you will?

PDLJS: There is access to His Majesty. He's there every Friday, and they will see him and pass on letters to him. So every time he comes back with letters complaining about the ministers not doing anything, and the next day all the ministers will have to answer all of the questions.

DA: Does he ever do anything for the people?

PDLJS: Oh, yes. One example is of a market that is operating and the ministers were saying that they wanted to move the vendors to a better place. But the vendors were saying, we've been here for generations, and we want to stay here because this is our place and history and people. So His Majesty came down and talked to them, and they told His Majesty they want to stay. And I think His Majesty took their word and said, “Alright.” They have access to him; they write letters to the palace with requests. The ministers are reminded again and again that everything is for the people, not for themselves. But this message is not well publicized. So His Majesty is always being portrayed as this and that, so he said, “I live with it.”


Sumber - World Policy Institute