The silent claimant in the South China Sea

Brunei is often overlooked in South China Sea dispute. But Brunei has a plan.

by Oliver Ward

As the South China Sea dispute brings Southeast Asia to crisis point, one silent, often overlooked claimant is turning the situation to its advantage. The small nation of Brunei Darussalam is rarely mentioned among the biggest payers of the dispute. But, it holds a valid claim to 200 square nautical miles of the region.

Brunei prefers to whisper while other nations shout

Brunei’s claims originated in 1984, when it established an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEC) of 200 nautical miles over its continental shelf. Parts of the same region are also claimed by Malaysia, China, Taiwan and Vietnam and it includes Bombay Castle, Louisa Reef and Owen Shoal.

In 2003, Brunei protested China’s research in its waters and in 2009, Malaysia and Brunei came to an agreement over the collaboration in the exploration and exploitation for hydrocarbons in the territory. But, while other nations asserted their claims in loud international gestures, Brunei took a much quieter approach.

After this agreement, Brunei has done very little to assert its claim over the territory. They occasionally stop Vietnamese fishing boats in the sea tracts, but, there have been almost no incidents of instability or contestation in the region. Brunei does not even maintain a military presence in the disputed territory.

Why does Brunei occupy the role of a silent claimant?

Brunei does not need to shout and posture up. The reason is mutual dependence. Brunei needs China far too much to risk angering them over territorial claims. Oil resources account for 60% of Brunei’s GDP and 95% of exports. Tumbling oil prices have left Brunei searching to diversify its economy. It needs China to help it do this.

Between 2003 and 2013, exports to China increased from US$34 million to US$1.7 billion. This was due to projects like the Guangxi Beibu Gulf International Port Group Co. helped develop and manage Brunei’s major port and the establishment of the Guangxi-Brunei economic corridor. The economic corridor has led to over US$500 million in joint investment projects between Brunei and China.  The opening of the Chinese market for Brunei allows them to diversify their economy by exporting biotech and halal products to China.

On the other side, China also needs Brunei. The Chinese rely on Brunei’s oil. Chinese firm, Zhejiang Hengyi Group, has plans to construct a refinery in Brunei by 2019. The refinery will have the capacity to produce 148,000 barrels of oil a day when it is fully operational.

The region is more valuable as a method of securing trade and investment

The mutual dependency means Brunei have little need to make noise. Beijing is unlikely to bring a military presence to Brunei’s waters and the territory is far more valuable to Brunei as leverage, to promote investment and trade into the country than as a geographical territory.

China is using a tactic of chequebook diplomacy to avoid another tribunal at all costs. They intend to solve the competing claims in bilateral negotiations, which will mean big investment projects and high-value trade deals. Brunei already has oil reserves of 1.5 billion barrels and an agreement with Malaysia to exploit the 15 trillion cubic feet of natural gas beneath the sea bed. Therefore, the territory in the South China Sea is not as valuable as the deals with China it can secure in exchange for keeping quiet.

As Brunei heads towards its Wawasan Brunei 2035 economy overhaul, it needs investment in areas outside oil. The nation knows screaming its claim from the rooftops will get it nowhere with so many big players in the arena. But, whispering its claim in China’s ear will hopefully reap the rewards.


Sumber - ASEAN Today

South China Sea dispute: Will Indonesia play a bigger role in Asean?

An Indonesian navy vessel (foreground) next to a Chinese Coast Guard vessel near
the Natuna Islands. Indonesia is the only Asean country that China has refrained
from dispute-escalation with in the South China Sea.

By Johannes Nugroho

The late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once defined consensus as “something in which no one believes and to which no one objects”.

That would describe the approach of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean), at its recent Summit in Laos, when it comes to the South China Sea territorial disputes.

Although the adoption of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (Cues) in the South China Sea may signal that Asean and China have taken initial steps to build trust and confidence amid growing tensions, it is unlikely to work wonders.

China did not accept an international tribunal ruling on its claims in the South China Sea based on a legally binding convention such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, to which it is a signatory.

Why would it care about a non-binding agreement such as Cues?

The question remains whether Asean can maintain credibility if it fails to resolve a major flashpoint in its own backyard.

Logic dictates that Asean must somehow enact a more coherent set of working methods and understanding, both internally for its own members and externally to deal with China and other non-Asean parties.

To do so, Indonesia’s leadership is paramount. As a founding member of Asean and its traditional status as “first among equals”, Indonesia is well-placed to set the tone for the other member states.

Apart from its size, Indonesia is the only Asean country that China has refrained from dispute-escalation with in the South China Sea.

Chinese Coast Guard vessels did not hesitate to ram Vietnamese boats in 2014 in the standoff between both sides over China’s deployment of an oil-drilling rig in waters near Vietnam’s coast. China’s aggression towards the Philippines in the Spratly Islands is also well-documented.

In contrast, no retaliatory action was taken by China in the aftermath of the June incursion by a fleet of Chinese vessels into the Natuna Sea, to which the Indonesian navy responded by firing at and apprehending one vessel.

To defend its sovereignty over the Natuna Sea vis-a-vis a superior power such as China, Indonesia will need the collective strength of Asean and other like-minded member states.

Some may argue that getting Indonesia to play a bigger role in Asean on the South China Sea issue may not be easy.

The country’s engagement with Asean has waned since the fall of President Suharto in 1998. Increasing complexity in domestic populist politics and budgetary constraints in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have all produced a more inward-looking country with a less confident footing in regional geopolitics. To date, no ministerial blueprint on the South China Sea issue exists.

The election of the domestically popular President Joko Widodo has prompted very little change. Early in his presidency, Mr Widodo showed little interest in Asean diplomacy. Under his sink-the-boat policy for captured illegal foreign fishing vessels, the vessels originating from Asean countries such as Vietnam and Thailand bore the brunt first. The Indonesian government only destroyed its first Chinese vessel in 2015. Interestingly, the vessel in question had already been impounded in 2009.

But there are signs that things could be changing.

First, while China has repeatedly affirmed Indonesia’s claim to the Natuna Islands, it has argued that the overlapping waters are “China’s historical fishing ground”.

So when three incursions by Chinese fishing vessels occurred in the Natuna Sea this year — all supported and escorted by Chinese Coast Guard units — Jakarta must have realised that its avowed status as a “non-party” and an “honest broker” in the South China Sea disputes was no longer tenable.

Jakarta has since replaced its coast guard around the Natunas with naval ships and announced plans for a military buildup and economic development in the area, as outlined in its 2016 State Defence Paper and maritime policy.

Mr Widodo is now also more cognisant of Asean’s centrality to Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts. His active participation at the recent Asean Summit — where he called for Asean unity — may signal a change of heart. Mr Widodo also discussed the South China Sea issue with both Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte during their recent visits to Jakarta.

Faced with China’s unprecedented challenge in the Natuna Sea, Mr Widodo will need all the help he can muster, including insights from his fellow Asean leaders from the Philippines and Vietnam, which face similar territorial disputes with China, as well as from Singapore, which has significant economic and cultural ties with Beijing and is the country coordinator for Asean-China ties.

The Philippines, set to take the Asean chair next year, should welcome and support Indonesia’s increased regional engagement. President Widodo told the Indonesian press that he and President Duterte have a lot in common.

The fact that the subsequent misunderstanding over what the latter told the former about the fate of the Filipina on death row in Indonesia, Mary Jane Veloso, was quickly smoothed out points to a workable relationship between the two.

China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea has proved to be one of the most polarising issues that Asean has faced in recent years, testing its core function as the regional forum for conflict resolution.

It is important that Indonesia pulls its weight within Asean to prevent the association’s plunge into irrelevance.

Vietnam’s unease at the situation is already palpable. At a recent lecture in Singapore, Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang spoke against the “‘might makes right’ mindset”, clearly with China in mind.

Bearing in mind that Vietnam is already looking beyond Asean in its security stratagem, such as forging closer defence ties with India through their collaboration on the BrahMos missile system, the urgency of Asean unity is beyond doubt.

Let us hope that Indonesia, working alongside the other founding members, could pave the way to a consensus that everyone can work with and that no one objects to.


Sumber - TODAYonline

Tension Grows Between Japan and China over Islets

By Todd Crowell

Dress rehearsal for invasion at the Senkaku/Daoyus?

Tokyo has delivered a humiliating public protest to China’s ambassador for the intrusion of a vast “fishing fleet” escorted by a dozen coast guard and other law-enforcement vessels in or near waters of the disputed Senkaku islands, known as the Daioyus to the Chinese.

Such protests are common in the ongoing cat and mouse game in the East and South China Seas, but they are usually delivered in private. In this case Tokyo decided to turn its protest into political theater.

China’s Ambassador to Japan, Cheng Yonghua, was summoned to the foreign ministry, where news and television camera were waiting to film the encounter. Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida kept Cheng waiting for 10 minutes then entered, a stern look on his face, gesturing Cheng to sit down.

“Relations with China are becoming noticeably worse because China is trying to change the status quo,” Kishida lectured Cheng, who looked embarrassed by the media presence. Cheng responded that the Senkaku were Chinese territory and the two nations should “strive to reach a solution.”

Japan has become used to Chinese Coast Guard intrusions into its claimed territorial waters. On the average of once every two weeks, two or three Chinese ships intrude into Senkaku waters. They stay for a couple hours then leave.

But there had been nothing like what happened on Aug. 8 when a flotilla of more than 230 “fishing boats” escorted by up to 13 Chinese Coast Guard and other law enforcement vessels virtually surrounded the Senkaku islands for several days.

It was not immediately clear exactly what message the Chinese were trying to convey, although Tokyo has been very vocal in supporting the Philippines in their legal action against China resulting in the July 11 ruling that confirmed all of Manila’s charges.

Was the latest intrusion a dress rehearsal for war?

The various scenarios for war in the East China Sea, and possibly in the South China Sea, usually fall into two main categories. There is the “accidental” fight scenario. A Chinese destroyer’s radar locks on to a Japanese warship. The captain fires back in self-defense, and the incident spirals out of control.

That is one scenario. Another, possibly more realistic, is the “swarm” scenario: Several hundred “fishing boats” sail from ports in Zhejiang province for the Senkaku, where they overwhelm the Japanese Coast Guard by their sheer numbers.

This time the fishing boats land some 200 or so commandoes disguised as fishermen or “settlers.” The Senkaku are not garrisoned by Japanese troops, so no shots fired. The Chinese side says it is not using force, merely taking possession of what it claims to be its own territory.

Tokyo feels obliged to respond, although the Chinese landing force is too large to dislodge by ordinary policing methods, such as those that have been used in the past when a handful of activists – Chinese and Japanese – tried to land on the disputed islands and plant their flags.

That would put Japan in the position of being the first party to fire shots, possibly landing elements of the Western Infantry Regiment, which was created and trained specifically to recapture islands. Meanwhile, Tokyo hurriedly consults with Washington seeking assurance that it will honor its commitments to defend Japan.

On more than one occasion, including in remarks from President Barack Obama himself, the United States has stated that the Senkaku come under the provisions of the joint security treaty as they are administered by Japan.

In the most recent incident, the estimated 230 Chinese fishing vessels escorted by Chinese law enforcement vessels made no effort to land anyone, though the Japanese Coast Guard shadowing the vessels kept a sharp eye out for any sign of it.

China boasts the world’s largest commercial fishing fleet, but it is a matter of debate among security analysts as to extent to which China’s fishing fleet constitutes a paramilitary force, or as they sometime say, a “maritime militia.” Somehow a swarm of Chinese fishing boats always seem to materialize on cue in disputes in the East and South China Sea.

The use of fishing boats, not to mention the nominally civilian coast guard, tends to blur the distinctions between what is civilian and what is military. In any conflict the Japan and the US would have to deal with ostensibly civilian boats that could flood the battlefield turning it into a confusing melee.

“China’s fishing fleet is being encouraged to fish in disputed waters . . . and are being encouraged to do so for geopolitical as well as commercial reasons,” says Alan Duport, a security analyst at the University of New South Wales.

Swarm tactics have been used often in the South China Sea. Hundreds of boats converged in the Gulf of Tonkin in 2014 in the dispute over the oil drilling rig that the Chinese erected in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Beijing has dispatched swarms of fishing boats to the Laconia Shoals off the coast of Sarawak to fish in Malaysia’s EEZ, with escorts of coast guard vessels to protect them should Kuala Lumpur try to arrest them. Similar confrontations have taken place in Indonesia’s EEZ.

China has been commissioning new coast guard vessels, either converted navy frigates or purpose-built, cutters at an astonishing rate to the extent that it can now deploy ships in various corners of the contested waters simultaneously.

It is perhaps better that principal actors in the unfolding conflict are civilian vessels. But certainly lurking near by and ready to respond are the warships of the regular Chinese, Japanese, and America navies.


Sumber - Asia Sentinel

Vietnam ‘moves new rocket launchers’ into South China Sea

By Greg Torode

HONG KONG (Reuters) – Vietnam has discreetly fortified several of its islands in the disputed South China Sea with new mobile rocket launchers capable of striking China’s runways and military installations across the vital trade route, according to Western officials.

Diplomats and military officers told Reuters that intelligence shows Hanoi has shipped the launchers from the Vietnamese mainland into position on five bases in the Spratly islands in recent months, a move likely to raise tensions with Beijing.

The launchers have been hidden from aerial surveillance and they have yet to be armed, but could be made operational with rocket artillery rounds within two or three days, according to the three sources.

Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry said the information was “inaccurate”, without elaborating.

Deputy Defense Minister, Senior Lieutenant-General Nguyen Chi Vinh, told Reuters in Singapore in June that Hanoi had no such launchers or weapons ready in the Spratlys but reserved the right to take any such measures.

“It is within our legitimate right to self-defense to move any of our weapons to any area at any time within our sovereign territory,” he said.

The move is designed to counter China’s build-up on its seven reclaimed islands in the Spratlys archipelago. Vietnam’s military strategists fear building runways, radars and other military installations on those holdings have left Vietnam’s southern and island defenses increasingly vulnerable.

Military analysts say it is the most significant defensive move Vietnam has made on its holdings in the South China Sea in decades.

Hanoi wanted to have the launchers in place as it expected tensions to rise in the wake of the landmark international court ruling against China in an arbitration case brought by the Philippines, foreign envoys said.

The ruling last month, stridently rejected by Beijing, found no legal basis to China’s sweeping historic claims to much of the South China Sea.

Vietnam, China and Taiwan claim all of the Spratlys while the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim some of the area.

“China has indisputable sovereignty over the Spratly islands and nearby waters,” China’s Foreign Ministry said in a faxed statement on Wednesday. “China resolutely opposes the relevant country illegally occupying parts of China’s Spratly islands and reefs and on these illegally occupied Spratly islands and reefs belonging to China carrying out illegal construction and military deployments.”

The United States is also monitoring developments closely.

“We continue to call on all South China Sea claimants to avoid actions that raise tensions, take practical steps to build confidence, and intensify efforts to find peaceful, diplomatic solutions to disputes,” a State Department official said.

STATE-OF-THE-ART SYSTEM

Foreign officials and military analysts believe the launchers form part of Vietnam’s state-of-art EXTRA rocket artillery system recently acquired from Israel.

EXTRA rounds are highly accurate up to a range of 150 km (93 miles), with different 150 kg (330 lb) warheads that can carry high explosives or bomblets to attack multiple targets simultaneously. Operated with targeting drones, they could strike both ships and land targets.

That puts China’s 3,000-meter runways and installations on Subi, Fiery Cross and Mischief Reef within range of many of Vietnam’s tightly clustered holdings on 21 islands and reefs.

While Vietnam has larger and longer range Russian coastal defense missiles, the EXTRA is considered highly mobile and effective against amphibious landings. It uses compact radars, so does not require a large operational footprint – also suitable for deployment on islets and reefs.

“When Vietnam acquired the EXTRA system, it was always thought that it would be deployed on the Spratlys…it is the perfect weapon for that,” said Siemon Wezeman, a senior arms researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

There is no sign the launchers have been recently test fired or moved.

China took its first Spratlys possessions after a sea battle against Vietnam’s then weak navy in 1988. After the battle, Vietnam said 64 soldiers with little protection were killed as they tried to protect a flag on South Johnson reef – an incident still acutely felt in Hanoi.

In recent years, Vietnam has significantly improved its naval capabilities as part of a broader military modernization, including buying six advanced Kilo submarines from Russia.

Carl Thayer, an expert on Vietnam’s military at the Australian Defence Force Academy, said the deployment showed the seriousness of Vietnam’s determination to militarily deter China as far as possible.

“China’s runways and military installations in the Spratlys are a direct challenge to Vietnam, particularly in their southern waters and skies, and they are showing they are prepared to respond to that threat,” he said. “China is unlikely to see this as purely defensive, and it could mark a new stage of militarization of the Spratlys.”

Trevor Hollingsbee, a former naval intelligence analyst with the British defense ministry, said he believed the deployment also had a political factor, partly undermining the fear created by the prospect of large Chinese bases deep in maritime Southeast Asia.

“It introduces a potential vulnerability where they was none before – it is a sudden new complication in an arena that China was dominating,” he said.


Sumber - Asia Times

ASEAN and China at a crossroads after South China Sea ruling

Author: Sourabh Gupta, ICAS

Almost 30 years to the day that a young, Harvard-trained American lawyer won a famous judgment at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States, Paul S Reichler pulled off another momentous victory at The Hague. This time the judgment was against China for having breached its international treaty obligations in the South China Sea.

Washington refused to honour the 1986 award, citing Managua’s selective application of the law, the highly charged political nature of the case and the ICJ’s overreach in asserting jurisdiction. Later that year, it cast the sole veto against a UN Security Council draft resolution calling for full and immediate compliance with the judgment. China was one of 11 states on the Council to vote in favour.

Beijing now restates each of the accusations made by the defence that day. Yet one hopes that it will set a better example of compliance than Washington. It is also in its enlightened self-interest to do so.

China’s emerging policy approach is one of non-acceptance of the award while supporting escalation control on the ground. This is coupled with an offer to negotiate with the Philippines. The political cost–benefit calculus underlying this policy will gradually but decisively shift against China with each passing month — especially as Manila forces the issue in order to collect the benefits conferred by the award.

Hanoi too stands poised to force claims that it enjoys traditional fishing rights within the territorial sea of the Paracel Islands. It can also claim, pointing to the award, that none of the high-tide features there are fully entitled islands, and that, as a result, the features cannot generate their own exclusive economic zones (EEZs).

China’s favoured ‘dual-track’ approach holds that disputes should be resolved through talks between directly concerned parties, while China and ASEAN countries should jointly pursue stability in the South China Sea. In light of the ruling, China must discreetly implement an ‘early harvest’ set of compliant actions within this ‘dual-track’ framework. These could include allowing re-entry of Filipino traditional fishermen to the territorial sea of the Scarborough Shoal and China withdrawing its paramilitary presence from the Second Thomas Shoal area.

Beijing should also seize this opportunity to clarify the geographic limits of its ‘relevant waters’ claim in the South China Sea and the functional nature of the ‘historic right’ of access that it seeks in these waters.

ASEAN too must brace for the implications of the award, particularly on the security front. The decision to annul all extended maritime claims associated with China’s land features on the Philippines’ continental shelf is effectively an endorsement of a 2009 submission filed by Malaysia and Vietnam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. That submission also implied that none of the features in the Spratlys group were capable of generating EEZs or continental shelf rights.

That filing took China by surprise and touched off a protest note featuring the nine-dash line. The Tribunal’s ruling will encounter a similar, if not greater show of resolve by Beijing, both on the table and at sea.

Sovereignty-linked issues of jurisdiction have always been tied to a larger political calculus of stability and good neighbourliness. China’s rulers have not been shy in calibrating their stance between a hardline and a flexible one to suit the strategic circumstances at hand. Should Philippine ‘armed forces’ or ‘public vessels’ provide escort to private efforts to restart oil and gas development on its continental shelf, the United States could be drawn into the line of fire. This would have cascading implications for peace and stability in the South China Sea.

The Tribunal’s award brings into question the call to expeditiously conclude a China–ASEAN ‘Code of Conduct’ (COC). The area of application of the COC’s rules was premised on the existence of unresolved maritime boundary areas of concerned parties in the South China Sea. Having produced a de facto delimitation of the China–Philippines maritime boundary (and furnished principles for the China–Vietnam one too), the Tribunal has effectively undercut the raison d’être that sustains the envisaged code.

Both ASEAN and China would be better off reframing their COC interactions to a trimmed-down dialogue on preventive mechanisms that set and stabilise the rules of engagement and communication for their paramilitaries. Such a code could be framed along the lines of the multinational Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea.

The scope for functional cooperation in the South China Sea has been set back in no uncertain terms. Had Itu Aba been ruled a fully entitled island, it could have facilitated a basis for oil and gas joint development in the overlapping water areas. With no geographic overlap to contend with, China’s principle of ‘shelving differences and seeking joint development’ has become a hollow slogan. There are no differences of entitled rights left to shelve.

The contours of functional cooperation will need to evolve from bilateral actions to subregional activities in cross-cutting areas. Such activities could include environmental protection, maritime search and rescue, and cooperation against piracy and transnational crime.

The arbitration has ripped apart the deliberate ambiguity that has at times helpfully spurred the search for win–win solutions to the region’s overlapping challenges at its peripheries. Yet another Asian frontier has now been transformed, to quote Lord Curzon, into a ‘razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace’. The tenuous quiet in the immediate wake of the award will not last.

As China and ASEAN gingerly mould a ‘new normal’ in the South China Sea, they stand at an important crossroads. They can either advocate for exclusivist answers to the challenges in their designated maritime zones — the littoral states’ preference. Or they can throw their weight behind comprehensive and overarching cooperative frameworks — China’s preference — that secure peace and stability. Whatever their chosen path, China and ASEAN must first form an important consensus on this point. Papering over this choice will be harder than papering over the language in their summit communiques. Muddling through is not an option.


Sumber - East Asia Forum

US Navy to China: We'll continue operations in South China Sea

By Jim Sciutto

Washington (CNN)The U.S. will continue freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, a senior Navy officer says, as the region continues to react to a landmark Hague ruling on territorial claims in the disputed waters.

The Obama administration has made it "absolutely clear" to China that the U.S. will continue engaging in flights and naval activities in the disputed waters despite objections from Beijing, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mark Richardson said Tuesday.

This month, an international tribunal in the Hague deemed the bulk of China's territorial claims in the South China Sea to have no legal basis under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The case was brought by a fellow South China Sea claimant, the Philippines. China immediately dismissed the court decision as "null and void" and said it would not affect its claims.

U.S. 'does not take a position'

Speaking in Vientiane, Laos, following the ASEAN Regional Forum, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said that the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea is "absolutely critical."

The U.S. "does not take a position on the side of one claimant or another claimant," Kerry added.

"What we are pushing for is absolute support for rule of law, for the legal process, and for diplomacy to work out the differences that people have."

Kerry said he had a "constructive meeting" on how the U.S. and China would proceed on this issue with Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Forum.

Relationship 'progressing'

Richardson, who just returned from a visit to China, said that he also made clear to his Chinese counterpart that any attempt by China to declare an air identification zone, or ADIZ, over the South China Sea, or efforts to build artificial islands in the Scarborough Shoal in disputed waters closer to the Philippines, were "clearly identified as concerns" for the US.

Richardson said that as close calls between US and Chinese warships grow more frequent, US and Chinese protocols for such encounters have been effective at avoiding escalation or misunderstanding.

Altogether, he said, "I see the relationship as progressing rather than at an impasse."


Sumber - CNN

ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement

BY MANUEL MOGATO, MICHAEL MARTINA AND BEN BLANCHARD

Southeast Asian nations failed to agree on maritime disputes in the South China Sea on Sunday after Cambodia blocked any mention to an international court ruling against Beijing in their statement, diplomats said.

Foreign ministers from the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) met for the first time since the Permanent Court of Arbitration handed an emphatic legal victory to the Philippines in the dispute this month.

The ruling by the court in The Hague denied China's sweeping claims in the strategic seaway, through which more than $5 trillion in global trade passes each year.

China claims most of the sea, but ASEAN members the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei all have rival claims. Beijing says the ruling has no bearing on its rights in the sea, and described the case as a farce.

The Philippines and Vietnam both wanted the communique issued by ASEAN foreign ministers after their meeting to refer to the ruling and the need to respect international law, ASEAN diplomats said. Their foreign ministers both discussed the ruling with ASEAN counterparts in the Laotian capital.

But before the meeting, China's closest ASEAN ally Cambodia opposed the proposed wording, throwing the group into disarray. Phnom Penh supports Beijing's opposition to any ASEAN stand on the South China Sea, and its preference for dealing with the disputed claims on a bilateral basis.

FIRST DEADLOCK SINCE 2012

"We are still working on it," Indonesia's Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi told Reuters after the meeting on Sunday, adding that she hoped the ASEAN members would reach an agreement.

Cambodia's Foreign Minister Prak Sokhon declined to comment on his country's position on Sunday.

Even after a late-night meeting of foreign ministers called to thrash out the issue late on Saturday, the region's top diplomats were unable to find a compromise.

The group has given itself until Tuesday to come to issue a statement, said one ASEAN diplomat.

ASEAN is facing the prospect of being unable to issue a statement after a meeting for only the second time in its 49-year history. The first time, in 2012, was also due to Cambodia's resistance to language about the South China Sea.

"We have been here before and I hope they can solve it," said one official from the ASEAN Secretariat in Indonesia. "It is the same story again, a repeat of the meeting in 2012."

Over the next two days, Southeast Asian nations will meet with China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. Kerry and Wang are also expected to meet and discuss the maritime issues.

Wang, who started bilateral meetings with ASEAN members on Sunday, said he thought the media focus on the South China Sea issue was "very strange".

It was "not a China-ASEAN issue," he said, adding that disputes should be resolved among the parties involved.

Japan's Foreign Minister Fumiko Kishida will also be in Laos for the ASEAN regional forum meeting. It is unclear if he will meet Wang, but China reacted angrily to Kishida saying he would discuss the sea issue if they do meet.

China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang, in a statement posted on the ministry's website, said the sea is not Japan's concern.

"We urge Japan not to hype up and meddle in the South China Sea issue," he said. "Japan is not a concerned party in the South China Sea, and because of its disgraceful history is in no place to make irresponsible comments about China."

U.S. ROLE

The United States, allied with the Philippines and cultivating closer relations with Vietnam, has called on China to respect the court's ruling.

It has criticized China's building of artificial islands and facilities in the sea and has sailed warships close to the disputed territory to assert freedom of navigation rights.

But Kerry will urge ASEAN nations to explore diplomatic ways to ease tension over Asia's biggest potential military flashpoint, a senior U.S. official said ahead of his trip.

Chinese state media called for "damage control" at the meetings. A commentary published by the official Xinhua news agency on Sunday said the court ruling was a "blow to peace and stability in the region ... and only serves to increase the likelihood of confrontation and turbulence."

Barack Obama is set in September to become the first U.S. president to visit Laos, attending an annual summit hosted by the country that holds the ASEAN chairmanship.

Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi is also in Laos, making her debut at ASEAN meetings as the foreign minister for Myanmar.


Sumber - Reuters

Philippines wins South China Sea case against China

International tribunal’s ruling will increase pressure on China to scale back military expansion in disputed region

China has lost a key international legal case over strategic reefs and atolls that it claims would give it control over disputed waters of the South China Sea.

The judgment by an international tribunal in The Hague is overwhelmingly in favour of claims by the Philippines and will increase global diplomatic pressure on Beijing to scale back military expansion in the sensitive area. By depriving certain outcrops of territorial-generating status, the ruling effectively punches holes in China’s all-encompassing “nine-dash” line that stretches deep into the South China Sea.

China reacted angrily to the verdict, which declares large areas of the sea to be neutral international waters or the exclusive economic zones of other countries. Xinhua, the country’s official news agency, hit out at what it described as an “ill-founded” ruling that was “naturally null and void”. The Communist party mouthpiece newspaper the People’s Daily said in an editorial that the tribunal had ignored “basic truths” and “tramped” on international laws and norms. “The Chinese government and the Chinese people firmly oppose [the ruling] and will neither acknowledge it nor accept it,” it added.

Speaking to reporters Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said: “Chinese people will not accept the result and all people around the world who uphold justice will not accept the result.”

“Now the farce is over it is time to get back to the right track,” Wang added, hinting that Beijing would now be willing to enter into negotiations with the Philippines “over the South China Sea issue”.

The Philippine foreign affairs secretary, Perfecto Yasay Jr, said the country welcomed the ruling and called for “restraint and sobriety.”

The ruling will make grim reading for Beijing and contains a series of criticisms of China’s actions and claims. The tribunal declared that “although Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other states, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources.

“The tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’.”

None of the fiercely disputed Spratly Islands, the UN body found, were “capable of generating extended maritime zones … [and] having found that none of the features claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone, the tribunal found that it could — without delimiting a boundary — declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China.”

The tribunal “found that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone. The tribunal also held that fishermen from the Philippines (like those from China) had traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these rights in restricting access. The tribunal further held that Chinese law enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine vessels.”

It also condemned China’s land reclamation projects and its construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands, concluding that it had caused “severe harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species”.

China’s land reclamation “was incompatible with the obligations on a state during dispute resolution proceedings”, it added, since it involved causing “irreparable harm to the marine environment”, building a “large artificial island in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone”, and destroying “evidence of the natural condition of features in the South China Sea that formed part of the parties’ dispute”.

Paul Reichler, of the law firm Foley Hoag LLP, who who coordinated the Philippines’ legal team, said: “The tribunal’s ruling not only benefits the Philippines, it also benefits other states bordering the South China Sea like Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. If China’s nine-dash line is invalid as to the Philippines, it is equally invalid to those states and, indeed, the rest of the international community.”

Beijing claims 90% of the South China Sea, a maritime region believed to hold a wealth of untapped oil and gas reserves and through which roughly $4.5tn of ship-borne trade passes every year. Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan also contest China’s claims to islands and reef systems closer to their territory than Beijing’s.

China says it follows a historical precedent set by the “nine-dash line” that Beijing drew in 1947 following the surrender of Japan. The line has been included in subsequent maps issued under Communist rule.

Sporadic violence between Chinese vessels and those of south-east Asia militaries have broken out in recent decades and the verdict, the first international legal decision on the issue, could have unpredictable consequences.

Ashley Townshend, a scholar at the University of Sydney’s United States Studies Centre, said the tribunal’s decision to disqualify China’s “nine-dash” claim on the basis of historic rights was “a huge setback for Beijing”. China had stirred up so much nationalism over the South China Sea issue that it would now have to respond in some way.

“In terms of China’s domestic politics [the ruling] is unacceptable to the regime and unfortunately the regime will perceive that the Chinese people view that as unacceptable,” Townshend predicted.

“So there will be huge pressures on Beijing to respond, to save face, to demonstrate with more than just words that it doesn’t abide by and doesn’t credit the ruling with any legal validity and will not adhere to it and will defend its ‘sovereign space’ in the South China Sea.”

Townshend said he did not expect Beijing to lash out militarily but believed further military drills in the South China Sea were possible as well as the establishment of an air defence identification zone somewhere over the region.

Xu Liping, a pro-Beijing scholar from China’s National Institute of International Strategy, told the Guardian he believed the ruling was “biased and unfair”, “absolutely terrible” and “a joke”.

The case at the permanent court of arbitration in The Hague, the UN-appointed tribunal that adjudicates in international disputes over maritime territory, has been running since 2013.

The judgment does not allocate any of the outcrops or islands to rival countries but instead indicates which maritime features are capable under international law of generating territorial rights over surrounding seas.

Last year, US officials claimed the Chinese had built up an extra 800 hectares (2,000 acres) on their occupied outposts across the South China Sea over the previous 18 months. The main focus of activity has been on Mischief Reef, where satellite images reveal the island is growing bigger, and is surrounded by fleets of dredgers and tankers.

China has previously stated that it “will neither accept nor participate in the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines”. The tribunal ruled, however, that China’s refusal to participate did not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

Beijing has the support of Russia and Saudi Arabia but has also garnered backing from dozens of smaller nations far from and not greatly affected by the hearing, including landlocked African countries Niger and Lesotho, as well as Palestine, Afghanistan and Togo. Vanuatu, a Pacific island nation of fewer than 300,000 citizens, also supports Beijing.

The Philippines has been backed by the US, UK, France, Japan and others.

The Philippine president, Rodrigo Duterte, is widely considered unpredictable and his moves in the next days and weeks will determine what could happen next.


Sumber - The Guardian

Picking Sides: A World of Opinions on South China Sea Case

By Matthew Pennington

A case brought by U.S. ally the Philippines against China represents a diplomatic dilemma for far-flung nations as Washington and Beijing rally support for their respective positions on the use of international arbitration in South China Sea disputes.

The United States has been building diplomatic pressure in the West and in Asia on China to abide by the Hague-based tribunal's decision, which is expected soon. China, which maintains it won't be bound by the ruling, has been pushing back by building support from nations mostly in Africa and the Mideast.

The U.S. is not a party to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, under which the tribunal has been constituted, but says it wants China to play by international rules. Since there is no enforcement mechanism for the ruling, any impact will depend on how the international community reacts.

Here's a look at where dozens of countries stand:

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

ASEAN has been trying for years to achieve diplomatic solutions in the South China Sea, making little progress and exposing divisions in the 10-member bloc, which includes the Philippines. Reaching consensus on the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling will be tough.

When President Barack Obama met ASEAN leaders in February they agreed on "full respect for legal and diplomatic processes" in accordance with the U.N. convention, but pro-China members Cambodia and Laos nixed any mention of "arbitration."

Vietnam, which has fought China over competing South China Sea claims, has been most supportive of the Philippines' case and submitted a statement to the tribunal. Hanoi has said it supports "full compliance" to the procedures of the convention.

But other ASEAN nations are generally wary of speaking out for fear of alienating China, the region's economic heavyweight. Malaysia and Brunei have said little about the case, though they too are South China Sea claimants.

Indonesia and Singapore are not claimants but have been a bit more outspoken. Singapore's Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said last week that the ruling could have implications beyond the South China Sea and "we cannot subscribe to the principle that might is right." Indonesia's Foreign Ministry declined to say whether the ruling should be binding on both sides but said international law must be respected.

Even the Philippines' position is unpredictable as a new government takes office there June 30. President-elect Rodrigo Duterte has expressed willingness to restart bilateral negotiations with China.

RUSSIA

Moscow, which shares China's suspicion of Washington, is Beijing's most prominent supporter on the issue. On a visit to China in April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia is against any interference from outside parties in the South China Sea — a reference to the U.S. — "or any attempts to internationalize these disputes." Like China, Russia says disputes should be resolved through talks between the parties directly involved.

CHINA SUPPORTERS IN AFRICA, MIDEAST

China's state news agency Xinhua on May 20 said that more than 40 countries have expressed support for China's stance on the arbitration case. The Foreign Ministry has in recent weeks given prominent mention to support it claims to have from nations principally in Africa, the Mideast and Central Asia.

But few of those foreign governments have issued statements independently. Some, including Cambodia, Laos and Fiji, have disavowed China's description of their position.

Experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington said they could confirm official statements from Afghanistan, Gambia, Niger, Sudan and Vanuatu. A Chinese statement with the 21-member Arab League supported China but it was unclear if it represented all the parties' official positions.

EUROPEAN UNION and G-7

The EU has urged all South China Sea claimants to resolve disputes through peaceful means and "pursue them in accordance with international law," including the U.N. convention. The Group of Seven wealthy nations, which comprises Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.S. and the EU, has called on all states to fully implement decisions binding on them in courts and tribunals provided under the convention.

In June, French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian proposed that European navies coordinate patrols in Asian waters to reinforce a rules-based maritime order. He warned that if the laws of the sea are not respected in that region, they could also be challenged in the Arctic Ocean or Mediterranean Sea.

AUSTRALIA

In January, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said the China-Philippines ruling will be "extremely important" as a statement of international principle and will "settle once and for all" whether artificial reefs are entitled to territorial waters. But Australia has been less outspoken in support of arbitration than the U.S., perhaps mindful of Australia's own resistance to arbitration to resolve its disputed maritime border with tiny East Timor.

INDIA

India has not issued a categorical position on arbitration case, but has been broadly supportive of the application of international law. India shares U.S. concerns about Beijing's rising ambitions in the seas of Asia.

India's External Affairs Ministry says that "all countries must abide by international law and norms on maritime issues." India set an example in 2014 when it accepted a decision by the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration that ruled in favor of Bangladesh in a dispute over the countries' maritime boundary.

JAPAN

Japan was an early supporter of the Philippines' pursuit of arbitration and says both China and the Philippines should abide by the outcome. Japan sees that as upholding international law, but it also reflects concern that historic rival China seeks strategic control of vital sea lanes in the South China Sea that carry 80 percent of Japan's crude oil imports.

Japan's support of third-party dispute resolution is not universal. While it has sought to take its dispute with South Korea over the South Korean-held Dokdo or Takeshima islands to the International Court of Justice, it says no such action is needed in its dispute with China over the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands, which are administered by Japan.

SOUTH KOREA

 Like Japan, South Korea is heavily dependent on fuel imports that pass through the South China Sea, but it has closer ties with China and has been less inclined to speak out. The Foreign Ministry says South China Sea disputes should be resolved under internationally established regulations and that it is "looking with interest" at the Philippine-China arbitration case.

TAIWAN

Taiwan has complained that the tribunal has not solicited its views. While Taipei officially exercises the same nine-dash line claim as Beijing in the South China Sea, it is primarily concerned about Taiping island in the Spratlys. Taiwan administers that remote land feature and is concerned it could be designated as a rock without the rights granted to islands.


Sumber - ABC News

What a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone Means for Southeast Asia

It mainly means an ominous development

Speculation is growing that China will soon declare an Air Defense Identification Zone over parts or all of the South China Sea. It is the most likely response to an unfavorable ruling in the case challenging China’s claims in the South China Sea.

In anticipation of the verdict in the next few weeks, many are already speaking up to try and stay Beijing from making such declaration. US Secretary of State John Kerry warned Beijing that such a move would be “provocative and destabilizing.”

For its part China dropped hints it is thinking along those lines. “If the U.S. military makes provocative moves to challenge Chinese sovereignty in the region, it would give Beijing a good opportunity to declare an ADIZ,” said a source quoted in local media.

China’s first such defense zone, which it declared in November 2013 over a part of the East China Sea, was generally considered to be a response to Tokyo’s decision to nationalize the disputed Senkaku islands, which China calls the Daiyou Islands.

So what would a new Chinese ADIZ mean for Southeast Asia?

Boundaries. Much would depend on the boundaries that Beijing chooses to declare. One could be a large circle around the Spratlys, another circle around the Paracels, or both, or possibly even one that approximates the nine-dash line that Manila is challenging in court.

Beijing could also declare a defense identification zone along its southern coast and Hainan Island. That would make good defensive sense as China has many naval bases in this region. However, it would not serve to protest the tribunal’s expected verdict.

In such a zone, airlines are supposed to file flight plans with the claiming authority, maintain open radio contact and respond to inquiries. If they don’t answer, fighter aircraft are scrambled to investigate and conceivably force the aircraft to land.

A glance at the map would show how a zone over the Spratly’s would impact airline traffic in the South China Sea. A Spratlys zone would sit directly in the path of flights from Manila to Jakarta or Singapore, for example.

The East China Seas air defense identification zone that Beijing announced in 2013 covers only a part of the offshore waters, though a portion of it covered the Senkaku/Daioyus. Much of mainland China was untouched.

Historically, countries that have declared air defense zones, such as the United States or Japan, have done so for the entire coastline, not just pieces of it. That brings into question exactly what was its purpose?

Washington famously flew a pair of bombers through the zone after it was declared (and is likely to do so again if China declares a new one). On the other hand, it advised American civilian airlines to comply with the rules. According to the Chinese, 55 airlines from 19 countries traverse the zone.

China does not seem to be strictly enforcing the current East China Sea zone. By some accounts it has actually stopped enforcing it, although it is difficult to tell, as China does not publish figures on fighter scrambles.

To date no Japanese airline has been harassed, even though, at the urging of the government, they do not file flight plans with China.

Only one incident occurred in 2015 when Chinese authorities turned back a Lao Airlines Flight. But it was determined that it had not received permission to overfly the mainland on its way to Vientiane.

“It had nothing to do with the ADIZ”, Beijing said.

Enforcement.  Whether China will enforce any of its new ADIZs or essentially do nothing will depend a lot on the given situation, especially the impending decision of the tribunal, plus the number of fighter assets that can be deployed to the new Spratly bases.

The Chinese already have fighters stationed on islands in the Paracels in the northern part of the South China Sea that could be scrambled to engage with any suspicious flights. They can also depend on fighters stationed on Hainan Island.

Of course, China has already been building bases on several of the marine features in the Spratlys it claims as Chinese territorial waters. A couple of them now have airstrips long enough to handle high performance aircraft, potentially rotated from the mainland.

For the present, this contingency remains theoretical, as China has not yet dispatched any jet fighters to the Spratly bases. It claims the features, including a large lighthouse, are for protection of civilian marine commerce and uses as typhoon shelters.

However, fully developed military airfields, would “create a mechanism in which China would have de facto control over the South China Sea in any scenario short of war,” says the outspoken commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Adm. Harry Harris.

Legalities.  If China should declare an ADIZ in the South China Sea, there isn’t much that anyone can do about it except to sputter in impotence. Secretary Kerry can complain all he wants that the move is “provocative and destabilizing,” to no avail.

There is no arbitration tribunal, no Security Council to appeal to. ADIZ’s are not seriously governed by any international agreements. No law requires advanced notice for declaring such a zone. All declared ADIZs, including the United States, have been unilateral.

There is no law that says countries must obey them, though most countries do. Russia is an important exception. It doesn’t recognize anybody’s ADIZ and flies through them without a by-your leave. That is why, until recently, most Japanese fighter scrambles have been against Russian intruders rather than Chinese.

Taiwan’s new defense minister recently announced that Taipei will not recognize any new ADIZ declared in the South China Sea (where Taipei has its own claims.)

Air defense zones are basically relics of the early Cold War when long-range Russian bombers were the main threat. They are obsolete in the age of intercontinental missiles. The US imposed its own ADIZ as far back as 1950 and has not lifted it.

It is worth remembering that the first Chinese ADIZ covers only a portion of the country’ coastline, which brings into question whether they are meant serve any real defensive purpose, but are mainly counters in the ongoing struggle over who controls the East and South China Seas.


Sumber - Asia Sentinel

Japan Enters South China Sea Dispute

By Yoichi Funabashi

Boosting and training coast guards is a civilian-power solution to tensions in the East and South China Seas

In the coming months, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague is set to issue its judgment on the case brought by the Philippines that challenges China’s claims in the South China Sea. Beijing appears to be anticipating an unfavorable ruling and is reaffirming its stance on the illegitimacy of the UN tribunal.

Beijing has long argued that such disputes should be solved bilaterally and rejects international intervention. This non-multilateral strategy to negotiations works in China’s favor, leaving the claimants and other interested nations weak and divided on maritime security issues. But a united regional front is exactly what is needed to uphold the rules-based order and respond to China’s attempts to gradually change the status quo by coercive means.

Mindful of its own tensions with Beijing in the East China Sea, and of the importance of avoiding a split between Asia and the Pacific, Tokyo is now stepping forward to take the lead in strengthening policy coordination on maritime security. Japan is pioneering a civilian power approach that may offer an alternative to military solutions.

With financial backing from the Japan International Cooperation Agency, or JICA, the nation is trying to strengthen the region’s civilian law-enforcement apparatus. One major initiative is a new master’s program in “Maritime Safety and Security Policy,” jointly administered by the Japan Coast Guard, JCG, and the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.

The goal of the one-year course is to develop a network of future leaders, by offering an opportunity for junior coast guard officers from Asia to spend half a year studying in Tokyo and the other half at Japan’s coast guard academy in Hiroshima. Students currently enrolled in the program come from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Desperate for a non-military to disputes in the South China Sea, ASEAN countries are increasingly interested in the JCG role in maritime law enforcement.

The JCG is a civilian force under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism that is tasked with protecting Japan’s territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone – the sixth largest EEZ in the world at approximately 4.47 million square kilometers. Open and safe sea lanes are an existential challenge for Japan, a resource-poor island nation.

The JCG has a successful history of managing threats in the maritime sphere. For example in the 1990s and early 2000s, North Korea’s aggressive espionage operations in Japanese territorial waters were thwarted. Perhaps the most notable incident was in December 2001 when the JCG pursued what was later discovered to be a North Korean spy boat in the sea off south Japan. While fleeing, the North Korean boat attacked the JCG patrol boat with automatic machine guns and a rocket launcher, after which the JCG shot in self-defense. The spy boat soon sank of its own devices, and the rescued crewmembers were later brought to trial. The JCG’s ability to respond has allowed Japan to avoid resorting to military options in maintaining stability.

The JCG is highly trusted in Japan and has strong public support. The JCG even made its way into popular culture with Umizaru, or Sea Monkey, a manga series later adapted into a TV show and movie that follows the life a JCG officer on search-and-rescue missions.

However, over the past decade the JCG has faced unprecedented challenges to its ability to uphold the rule of law. Chinese vessels have increasingly entered into waters claimed by Japan and aggressively contested Japan’s territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Tensions have been somewhat diffused since escalations in 2010 when the JCG arrested a Chinese fishing trawler captain for ramming Japanese patrol boats, and in 2012 following the Japanese government’s purchase of the islands from its former private owner.

Despite the fact that China Coast Guard patrol boats now regularly enter the waters surrounding the Senkakus to assert their presence, a mechanism for stabilizing the situation has been built. Known as the 3-3-2 formula, three Chinese patrol boats enter the waters near the Senkakus three times a month for up to two hours each time, and leave after receiving a warning from the JCG.  This is by no means a resolution, but solving disputes is not the JCG’s goal. Its objective is to preserve the status quo through civilian law enforcement, and military options do not feature into the equation. It is a peace-building process that paves the way for diplomatic solutions to be explored.

The China Coast Guard’s massive CCG 2901 patrol vessel recently assigned to the East China Sea division has raised fears that the peace maintained by the coast guard is in jeopardy. The new vessel far surpasses JCG vessels and is equipped with military-type weapons, signaling China’s intentions to intimidate. The danger here is if Japan responds by calling upon its self-defense forces, JSDF, to intervene or by beefing up its own coast guard with larger boats and more powerful weapons.

A coast guard arms race could ensue that may see the coast guard transgress its civilian mandate. Indeed, the CCG 2901 is designed to test Japan’s resolve and exploit the gray areas of remit between the JCG and JSDF.

Similarly, China has launched another “monster” vessel, CCG 3901, which has set ASEAN nations on alert at the prospect of further militarization in the South China Sea. Regardless of such posturing, China has signaled that it does not want to engage in a military conflict over disputed islets and waters. Japan and ASEAN nations must therefore be careful not to react unwittingly to China’s provocations.

The Philippines vs China arbitration case ruling is set to become a defining moment for the future trajectory of China’s engagement with South China Sea claimant nations. One outcome is that Beijing will react by stepping-up its unilateral revisionist behavior as a bold statement of intent. On the other hand, victory for Rodrigo Duterte, president elect of the Philippines, has opened up the possibility of the country using a successful ruling as leverage at a bilateral negotiation table with China.

Current ritualization of interactions between the Japanese and Chinese coast guards in the East China Sea should be further entrenched. An alternative approach to maritime security has evolved – a tacit form of strategic ambiguity that doesn’t disturb the status quo and can steer both nations away from armed solutions towards diplomatic solutions. The success of this coast guard–maintained peace model has significant implications for the South China Sea and offers potential for replication.

In line with its shifting strategic identity towards proactive pacifism, Japan is expanding its military capacity-building assistance to ASEAN countries. But this is not enough, and carries risks of misunderstandings and miscalculations. Based on its own experiences in the East China Sea, Japan’s concept of capacity-building should be centered on rule making and law enforcement by civilian institutions. The JCG-led professional graduate program is one step in the right direction to constructing this new regional architecture.

A non-military approach can also open the path for greater policy coordination between ASEAN members that have struggled to form a shared position on how to respond to China’s great wall-of-sand construction.

As the scope of the JCG increases, Japan should become a forerunner in promoting a vision of a nation and region that pursues “global civilian power” in managing maritime security tensions.


Sumber - Asia Sentinel

Brunei silenced on South China Sea claims

China offers joint deep-sea drilling as oil revenues sink

Brunei is an absolute monarchist, Islamic state of 420,000 people on the north coast of Borneo, wedged into the Malaysian state of Sarawak. Indonesia and Malaysia own 99 percent of Borneo, which is the third largest island in the world, located at the maritime center of Southeast Asia. It has become a key pawn in China’s offense to control the South China Sea.

The United Nations Permanent Arbitration Court in The Hague is due to rule on the Philippines’ claim to the Scarborough Shoal – expected end-May or June. China is scrambling to find global and regional support for “direct bilateral negotiations” rather than international arbitration. It refuses to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court and says it will not abide by its rulings.

China is particularly keen to disable ASEAN from uniting against its ‘nine-dash line’ claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea. It has declared that Laos and Cambodia agree disputes should be settled through direct bilateral negotiations. It has now added Brunei to that list, removing three of the 10 members of ASEAN, which works only through group consensus.

‘Resource Curse’ grips Brunei

Over three decades since its independence from Britain in 1984, the kingdom flew on the magic carpet of oil and gas exports. Earnings from this natural resource enabled its society to be tax-free and well-provided with employment, public health, subsidized housing and free education. Its 29th Sultan, Hassanal Bolkiah, is one of the world’s richest men, with personal net worth estimated at US$20-27 billion.

The oil price is now off 70 percent from its 2008 peak. Like all countries overly dependent on commodity exports, Brunei suddenly finds itself hostage to a global pricing slump. As 90 percent of government finances come from oil and gas, that has unhinged the entire economy. Plans to diversify from oil dependency are drafted in an ambitious grand plan called Vision Brunei 2035. Almost 80 percent of citizens are employed directly by the government or its statutory corporations.

Brunei’s ground oil reserves are estimated to run out in two decades as well. Deep-sea drilling and exploration for oil and gas, is prohibitively expensive. China has reached out to jointly explore deep-sea opportunities for production sharing. Brunei has accepted the deal and made its peace on overlapping sea claims.

Aside from The Philippines, the other littoral ASEAN states with Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) cutting across China’s nine-dash line are Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles off the coasts of maritime countries.

Establishing facts & dishing cash

China’s nine-dash line claim is recognized by no international body. It converts its claim into practical reality through forward deployment and occupation of islands in dispute. It is doing so at speed.

ASEAN states’ EEZs will remain unexploited, without the cash to invest in deep-sea drilling tests, and technology to extract reserves. China has the financial capacity to fund deep-sea exploration and the strategic need for hydrocarbon energy. It is using the cash bait to co-opt littoral ASEAN states into its South China Sea co-prosperity scheme. It also has infrastructure goodies on offer in its ‘Belt and Road’ master plan.

Block passage, checkmate Taiwan

Brunei is an important pawn neutralized on the chessboard, to stymie any ASEAN pushback. The parallel strategic benefit for China in the South China Sea, would be military control over these waters, to choke timely arrival of US Forces to defend Taiwan or Japan – both of whom have defence pacts with the USA.

China calculates that the US would rather avoid confrontation with an assertive power with military assets in place. Its South China Sea militarization is rapidly reaching critical mass. The US has shown no firm resolve to challenge that. The ASEAN nations have no capacity to stop China’s navy, or its rampaging fishing fleets.

The reunification of Taiwan is a highly charged national dream which President Xi Jinping has stoked. He already enjoys huge popularity with the masses – although not in Taiwan – for his sustained anti-graft campaign, which has snagged ‘tigers and flies’ at all levels of the government and party – sweeping away factions and personalities opposed to his unprecedented consolidation of personal power.

He has seven more years left of his two-term limit. If Taiwan is reunited with the mainland under his watch, Xi would be elevated to the level of Mao and Deng, on the altar of historic CCP heroes. Neither of these CCP strongmen could lock-up Taiwan. The last ruler who unified China was Emperor Qin Shi Huang in 221 BC.

Control over the South China Sea would bring that glorious day closer. US aircraft carriers just need to be delayed long enough for the PRC to reintegrate Taiwan. Political formulae for a high degree of autonomy and a separate local legislature, are well discussed exchanges in the long-running cross-straits talks.

After all, the US has accepted One-China sovereignty. It would be checkmate and game for China, without a shot being fired. Isn’t that what war strategy is all about – winning without a fight?


Sumber - Asia Sentinel

The South China Sea Dispute Isn't About Oil, At Least Not How You Think

Jeremy Maxie

The geopolitical context in the South China Sea (SCS) has evolved considerably since I first wrote a client briefing on the implications of the territorial disputes on upstream oil and gas development in 2008; however, the fundamental nature of disputes over oil and gas development remains much the same. On April 8, 2016, Hanoi demanded that China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) remove its Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HD-981) exploratory drilling rig from Vietnam’s territorial waters. This same Chinese-built rig sparked a similar incidents in 2014 and 2015. Despite high-profile incidents such as the ones involving the HD-981 drilling rig, the SCS territorial dispute is not about oil and gas—at least not how you think.

All too frequently the SCS dispute is framed as a militarized contest for access and control over an untold abundance of oil and gas thought to lie beneath the seabed. This “resource conflict”  narrative overlooks the complex and dynamic geopolitical and strategic drivers at play, and misplaces the role of hydrocarbons. In terms of resource competition, disputes over fishing are far more frequent than those involving offshore drilling and are arguably more important. Indeed, on April 3, 2016 Vietnam seized a Chinese ship that intruded into its territorial waters carrying fuel to resupply a Chinese fishing fleet operating in the area.

Applied to the SCS territorial dispute, the resource conflict narrative inverts the causal relationship between hydrocarbon development and the territorial disputes. Competition over offshore oil and gas resources is a component rather than the proximate cause of the territorial disputes between China and other claimants. The SCS dispute is about oil and gas resources to the extent that offshore developments are leveraged to assert or challenge territorial claims. China is not asserting expansive territorial claims and risking military confrontation with its neighbors (and potentially the United States) just to gain access and control of unproven oil and gas resources; instead, the development of offshore oil and gas resources is contested because it evokes sovereignty.

Estimates of oil and gas reserves vary since the SCS remains mostly under-explored with the majority of unproven reserves located in offshore deep-water areas. According to the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) the South China Sea is thought to hold 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (Tcf) including both proven (P90) and possible (P50) reserves. These high-end estimates are the most widely quoted, frequently without the caveat that it includes probable reserves which only have a 50% certainty of being recovered under existing economic and technological conditions. This misrepresentation adds to the misconceptions that drives the resource conflict narrative.

The EIA South China Sea report estimates Vietnam’s reserves at 3.0 billion barrels of liquids and 20 Tcf of natural gas, while China’s are at 1.3 billion barrels of liquids and 15 Tcf of natural gas. The Philippines’ share of reserves is only 0.2 billion barrels of liquids and 4.0 Tcf of natural gas. Malaysia has the biggest share, with 5.0 billion barrels of liquids and 80 Tcf natural gas, while Indonesia hold 55 Tcf of natural gas but only 0.3 billion barrels of liquids.

In contrast, CNOOC claims that the SCS holds an estimated undiscovered 125 billion barrels of oil and 500 Tcf of natural gas. These numbers are likely inflated for political purposes, as the consultancy Wood Mackenzie estimates that the SCS only holds about 2.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent. The focusing on estimated reserves of oil or natural gas is also misleading, as global average recovery rates for “oil in place” is only about 35% with technical limits estimated at 60-70% with enhanced oil recovery techniques.

To put things into perspective, all of the recoverable oil in the entire SCS would cover less than two years of Chinese oil demand and slightly more than two years of Chinese oil imports. In 2015, China’s oil demand averaged 10.32 million barrels per day (mb/d) while oil imports were 6.74 mb/d. This puts China’s annual oil demand at approximately 3.77 billion barrels, while annual oil imports were about 2.46 billion barrels. Assuming that all of the 11 billion barrels of proven and possible reserves in the entire South China Sea (including both contested and non-contested areas) were extracted at a 50% recovery rate, this would result in about 5-6 billion barrels of commercially recoverable crude oil. Vietnam’s 3.0 billion barrels of oil reserves located in the SCS would likely only yield enough recoverable crude oil to cover about six months of Chinese imports. The energy security dividend in terms of equity oil secured through Beijing’s attempt to commandeer the SCS is therefore tenuous.

The SCS is mostly gas prone. With an estimated 190 Tcf of proven and probable natural gas, the potential gas prize is much greater relative to oil. In 2015, Chinese gas demand was approximately 192 billion cubic meters (bcm) or 6.78 Tcf, including imports of 32 bcm (1.13 Tcf) of piped gas and 27 bcm (0.95 Tcf) of LNG. Therefore, the entire proven and possible gas reserves in the SCS (in contested and non-contested waters) is enough to theoretically cover 28 years of Chinese gas demand and 91 year of imports. Vietnam’s portion of the SCS is thought to only hold 20 Tcf, which is about 3 years of Chinese gas demand and ten years of imports. The estimated gas reserves in the Philippines are a marginal 4.0 Tcf.

Most of the gas in the SCS is located in offshore deep-water fields (defined as 400-1,200 meters) that is more technologically challenging and costly to develop than shallow-water or onshore fields. In order to monetize any potential deep-water gas discoveries, subsea pipelines would need to be built to onshore processing facilities. This means that gas developed in contested areas claimed by China but located near Vietnam or the Philippines could be delivered via pipeline to Vietnam or the Philippines to be sold on the local market or converted to LNG for export.

Such arrangements are politically inconceivable in the currently geopolitical environment unless the countries eventually agree to joint development—which may be one possible end-state that Beijing is working toward. An alternative option would be for China to use floating LNG (FLNG) vessels, but CNOOC reportedly abandoned such expensive and unproven plans in 2015.

Wherever SCS gas would be marketed and how it would be delivered (pipeline or LNG) would likely be based on commercial rather than political decisions and which may not materially contribute to Chinese energy security. These commercial, technological and logistical considerations strengthen the argument that the SCS territorial dispute is not driven by resource competition as an end to itself. Rather, resource competition is a means to an end—as an instrument for Beijing to assert territorial sovereignty for geopolitical and strategic purposes.

Even more indicative is that China’s most assertive and belligerent claims are directed towards Vietnam and the Philippines, rather than towards Malaysia and Indonesia which hold the largest shares of offshore oil and gas resources in the SCS. Beijing’s assertive behavior in the SCS has had a chilling effect on oil and gas exploration in disputed areas over the past decade that further suggest that developing offshore resources is not Beijing’s strategic priority.

To argue otherwise is to implies that Beijing is willing to risk military conflict in order to advance the commercial interests of a handful of Chinese oil companies in gaining control over unproven oil and gas resources that would make uncertain contributions to Chinese energy security—an improbable scenario considering the catastrophic consequences of such a conflict.

While offshore oil and gas resources are important sources of much needed supplies to Vietnam and  Philippines, the SCS is more consequential for Chinese energy security as a vital shipping lane than as an energy resource base. Currently, around 50% of the world’s oil tanker traffic is estimated to flow through the SCS. By 2035, it is expected that 90% of the Middle East fossil fuel exports will be shipped to East Asia with much of it transiting the SCS en route to China, Japan and South Korea.  In this context, the SCS is very much about oil and gas.


Sumber - Forbes

Philippines, Vietnam to explore joint sea patrols

Philippines’ Foreign Secretary Jose Rene Almendras (L) poses for a photo with Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh at the Government Guesthouse in Hanoi, on Monday

MANILA

DEFENCE officials from the Philippines and Vietnam will meet this week to explore possible joint exercises and navy patrols, military sources said, shoring up a new alliance between states locked in maritime rows with China.

Ties have strengthened between the two Southeast Asian countries as China’s assertiveness intensifies with a rapid buildup of man-made islands in the Spratly archipelago, to which Vietnam and the Philippines lay claim.

Both states are also on the receiving end of a renewed charm offensive by the United States, which is holding joint military exercises in the Philippines to be attended this week by US Defense Secretary Ash Carter.

Vietnam and the Philippines would discuss patrols and exercises, but a deal this week was unlikely, a senior army official said.

“These are initial discussions,” he said. “These may take time but we would like to move to the next level.”

The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorised to speak to the media. The information was confirmed by another defence ministry source in Manila.

Naval patrols between the Philippines and United States were proposed by Manila in January. They could happen within a year, a foreign ministry official said. “The two sides are still talking about this,” the official told Reuters.

The exploratory talks between Vietnam and the Philippines come as ships from the United States and Japan, which has its own maritime wrangles with China, have visiting ships currently docked at Subic Bay in the Philippines, which hosted Washington’s main naval base during the Vietnam War.

The regional dynamic has shifted substantially since then, with the United States now engaging Vietnam’s military having eased a lethal arms embargo in 2014. Japan is also working closely in defence issues with Manila and Hanoi, and two of its guided-missile destroyers are currently on a rare visit to Vietnam’s strategic base at Cam Ranh Bay.

Vietnam and the Philippines agreed on a strategic partnership in November to boost security relations as China expands its presence in the strategic waterway and deploys military equipment in the Spratly and Paracel islands.

Their closer ties mark a bold step in a region where China’s economic influence has made some countries reluctant to take a joint stand against its maritime manoeuvring.

Joint exercises would be one of the biggest steps taken by the two countries’ militaries since signing a defence agreement six years ago.

The meeting between Vietnam’s vice defence minister, Nguyen Chi Vinh, and Honorio Azcueta, the Philippine undersecretary of defense, is scheduled for today and comes as a court in The Hague nears a decision in an arbitration case lodged by Manila.

The ruling in the case, which seeks to clarify parts of a United Nations maritime law, could dent China’s claim to 90 per cent of the South China Sea, parts of which Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei also claim.

The South China Sea will figure in the talks between the two countries, as will bilateral exchanges, information-sharing, military logistics and defence technology, the sources said.

Vinh would tour Philippine bases, including a major naval facility. Vietnam’s state media has not reported the visit.

Two Vietnamese frigates made port calls to Manila in 2014 and a Philippine warship may do the same in Vietnam this June. Troops from both sides have played sports together twice since 2014 on disputed islands they occupy.

On Monday, Philippine Foreign Minister Jose Rene Almendras was the first foreign dignitary to meet Vietnam’s new prime minister, Nguyen Xuan Phuc.


Sumber - The Brunei Times

Why the South China Sea could be the next global flashpoint

Con Coughlin

When China earlier this week began operating the new lighthouse it has built on one of the artificial islands it has constructed in the South China Sea, it probably did not realise it would also illuminate the deepening tensions its policy of maritime expansion is creating in the region.

For, at a time when the world is mainly focused on the twin threats posed by Russia’s new spirit of military aggression and the rise of Islamic State (Isil), there is growing concern that not enough attention is being paid to a potentially far more worrying danger emerging from the South China Sea.

For more than a year China has been engaged in a massive military build up in the area, where it has turned what was formerly partially submerged reef into a network of artificial islands. By way of announcing the completion of what could prove to be an important strategic asset, China earlier this week began operating a newly-constructed lighthouse on one of these islands.

A statement issued by the Chinese foreign ministry tried to play down the significance of the lighthouse, arguing that it will provide a vital navigational tool for one of the world’s most important shipping arteries. A breathtaking $5 trillion in global trade is estimated to pass through the waters each year.

But turning on the 55-metre (189 foot) lighthouse has also refocused attention on the deepening tensions that have been created by China’s aggressive policy of expansionism in the region.

China’s island-building scheme is regarded as an unwelcome provocation by many of its neighbours, which see the programme as blatant bullying tactics aimed at consolidating Beijing’s claims over the energy-rich waters of the South China Sea.

This has resulted in both the US and several Asian allies making provocative gestures of their own as a means of signalling their own displeasure with Beijing’s actions. Last weekend a Japanese submarine made its first port call to the Philippines for 15 years to demonstrate increased military cooperation between the two countries, while Vietnam seized a Chinese ship for illegally entering its territorial waters.

Meanwhile, Washington has made its own displeasure known by sailing heavily-armed warships through the disputed waters and negotiating a deal with the Philippines to station weapons and troops for the first time in more than 20 years.

The question now is whether this dangerous escalation in military tensions will lead to open conflict, one that has the potential to be infinitely worse than the military challenges posed by Russia and Isil.

In an attempt to defuse the crisis US President Barack Obama left Chinese President Xi Jinping in doubt what he though about China’s tactics when the two leaders met last week.

But while Mr Xi insisted China had no interest in provoking “conflicts or confrontation”, the risk of serious military escalation will remain so long as Beijing refuses to resolve its maritime disputes by peaceful means.


Sumber - The Telegraph

Why ASEAN Must Remain Neutral on the South China Sea

Pressure is growing for the bloc to condemn China. It should resist.

By Scott Edwards

Pressure is growing on ASEAN to choose condemnation of China and both explicit and implicit support of the U.S. in the South China Sea. Proponents argue that this is a way to shift the tide and contain an expanding Chinese presence. And it has come at a time when ASEAN has demonstrated concern over the fast rising tensions in the area and increasing militarization, demonstrated by comments made at the most recent foreign ministers’ retreat. Formerly “neutral” states such as Indonesia are also signaling increased concern at the tensions and focusing on China’s role.

Clearly, ASEAN should play a significant future role in the South China Sea. If the current pressures find success, however, they could have a host of negative effects on both ASEAN’s internal coherency and its ability to play a meaningful role. Instead, ASEAN should continue to focus on its (limited) past success in trust and confidence building, both internally and externally. Trust is important in the region, and this would present an alternative future path for developments in the South China Sea by allowing ASEAN to have conflict-free engagement with China. Just as importantly, it would prevent ASEAN from allowing disagreements to upset intra-regional stability, with the potential to undo the bloc’s significant attempts to foster trust among its member states.

Attempts by the United States to engage with ASEAN as a regional bloc, one diplomatic culmination of the US “rebalance” to Asia, are often seen as pressuring ASEAN to take a stronger line in the South China Sea. The February Sunnylands summit, the first held between the leaders of the U.S. and ASEAN in the United States, was representative. Whilst Sunnylands boasted a mixed agenda including areas such as trade and counter-terrorism, observers were quick to demonstrate that the focus would be on the South China Sea, following comments made in the invitation. Despite U.S. President Barack Obama calling for ASEAN to present a united stance on the South China Sea issue, as well as hopes that the summit would result in increased cooperation, the outcome was limited to a vague declaration on shared commitments. Significantly, this declaration avoided explicitly drawing attention to China’s role in the emerging issues and tensions, and the summit was considered a failure. Sunnylands is not the first time such divisions have prevented a unified outlook towards the South China Sea; in 2012, for instance, ASEAN could not agree on a joint statement, the first time in 45 years this had happened.

The lack of willingness is seen outside of the region as reflecting a lack of strength or else a desire to appease China. Divisions are cited as a weakness of ASEAN and its policy of consensus which allows the member states to block a united front. These divisions are usually most marked between Vietnam and Philippines on the one hand, which have greater concerns about China, and members such as Cambodia, which has demonstrated a desire to avoid aggravating China. Cambodia has increasing military ties and rising Chinese aid and investment, making such a stance understandable. However, the divisions are not as black and white as made out. There are tangible reasons for ASEAN to maintain its united front – many don’t see China as simply a threat.  This is a fact recognized by officials from the countries within ASEAN, including both claimant states such as the Philippines and those that remain neutral such as Indonesia (though Indonesian neutrality may be waning). They argue that the South China Sea marks only one aspect of their extremely complex relations with China.

These perceptions may be changing slowly, seemingly further polarizing divides and pushing many of ASEAN’s members to take a harder line against China – desirable on the surface, but also problematic.

The Importance of Consensus

It should be understood that forcing ASEAN to choose sides may actually have dire consequences for the region, especially if states continue to have different (and complex) perceptions of China. Consensus has allowed a degree of trust and confidence to form among ASEAN member states, and this trust is important in an ASEAN with an expanding agenda, as states need to be assured that their interests will not be harmed in the myriad of sectors in which ASEAN wants to get involved. By maintaining consensus ASEAN member states are assured that their interests will be protected, and this has not only allowed an expanding agenda and increasing cooperation in the region, it has also been integral to the lack of conflict within ASEAN.

If ASEAN as a whole chooses to ignore the rationale behind the divisions and push forward with confronting China it may instead create strong distrust internally, as states could not be sure that their interests are secure. This could have disastrous effects on ASEAN as a whole if it creates fissures in other areas of ASEAN cooperation. ASEAN, and the West, should recognize the regional institution has a massive agenda that is not only limited to the South China Sea, and ask whether forcing a focus on this issue is worth the potential costs.

ASEAN choosing sides also undermines any future possibility of mediating tensions. ASEAN has made some progress in the past in attempting engagement with China through confidence building measures. The pinnacle of this was seen to be the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Building upon the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, the 2002 Declaration included China and declared a commitment to dialogue, trust-building, and peaceful means of dispute resolution. China, too, was the first external country to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003 which laid out the rules of behavior within ASEAN.

By inviting China into following the same set of rules in the region emphasizing peaceful resolution and dialogue it was hoped confidence could be built and cooperation increased through the evasion of escalation in the South China Sea. While it is clear at this stage that China is ignoring these agreements, if ASEAN were to choose sides it would prevent ASEAN from acting as a mediator in future, and means that militarization would be one of the only options remaining.

ASEAN’s Neutrality

Only by a measured response can ASEAN continue attempts at confidence building. While the chairman’s statement “reaffirmed the need to enhance mutual trust and confidence, exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities and avoid actions that may further complicate the situation, and pursue peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law,” it is unclear whether ASEAN can undertake such a task if its member states are increasingly divided or if it overtly chooses sides.

By maintaining a degree of impartiality multilaterally, ASEAN can continue to engage in confidence building measures and maintain trust within ASEAN. This does not preclude a harder line against China by the constituent member states, but that should continue to take place bilaterally. Trust is important, and maintaining it through consensus should be prioritized.


Sumber - The Diplomat